Macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy by Melina, Giovanni
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DEGLI STUDI DI SALERNO 
 
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche 
 
Dottorato di ricerca in Economia del Settore Pubblico 
 






Tesi di Dottorato  
in  
 
























This thesis investigates the macroeconomics effects of fiscal policy from a theoretical and
empirical perspective.
The first part of the thesis surveys recent theoretical and empirical studies in the
related literature. The analysis shows that while consensus has emerged on the pos-
itive effect that an expansionary fiscal policy has on output and hours worked, no
widespread consensus exists on the effects that such a policy delivers to private con-
sumption, real wages and investment. While in standard RBC models the negative
wealth effect on households’ lifetime resource constraint prevails, in more or less artic-
ulated new-Keynesian models a crowding-in effect of consumption and an increase in
wages is made possible also under plausible calibrations. While early empirical contribu-
tions gave credit to the standard neoclassical predictions, the most recent econometric
applications, generally making use of structural VARs, have supported and in many cases
have inspired the latest new-Keynesian claims.
Next, this work applies graphical modelling theory to identify fiscal policy shocks in
SVAR models of the US economy. Unlike other econometric approaches – which achieve
identification by relying on potentially contentious a priori assumptions – graphical mod-
elling is a data based tool. Our results are in line with Keynesian theoretical models,
being also quantitatively similar to those obtained in the recent SVAR literature à la
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and contrast with neoclassical real business cycle predic-
tions. Stability checks confirm that our findings are not driven by sample selection.
In its final part, the thesis empirically explores the information content of a large set
of fiscal indicators for US real output growth and inflation. We provide evidence that
fluctuations in certain fiscal variables contain valuable information to predict fluctuations
in output and prices. The distinction between federal and state-local fiscal indicators
yields useful insights and helps define a new set of stylized facts for US macroeconomic
conditions. First, we find that variations in state-local indirect taxes as well as state
government surplus or deficit help predict output growth. Next, the federal counterparts
of these indicators contain valuable information for inflation. Finally, state-local expen-
ditures help predict US inflation. A set of formal and informal stability tests confirm
that these relationships are stable. The fiscal indicators in questions are also among the
ones that yield the best in-sample and out-of-sample performances.
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Even though the effects of fiscal policy are of central importance in macroeconomics,
there is no widespread consensus on its impact and transmission channels onto many
macroeconomic variables. Both theoretical and empirical studies generally find a posi-
tive response of output and hours worked to a positive shock to government purchases
and the disagreement is usually about the magnitude and timing of the response. On the
contrary the sign of the responses of variables such as consumption, wages and invest-
ment is still a matter of debate. As shown by Baxter and King (1993), neoclassical Real
Business Cycle (RBC) theory generally predicts a positive response of investment and a
negative response of consumption and wages to a positive shock to government purchases.
In contrast, textbook IS-LM theory predicts that consumption should rise and thus am-
plify the expansionary effects of government spending on output. As Gali, Lopez-Salido
and Valles (2007) point out, this substantial difference across the two classes of models
lay on the more or less implicit assumption made on the behaviour of consumers: in the
IS-LM model consumption only depends on current disposable income, hence consumers
are all non-Ricardian; in the RBC model consumption depends on life-time wealth, hence
1
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consumers are all optimising Ricardian agents. In the RBC model, an increase in govern-
ment purchases, through an increase in current and/or future taxes, triggers a negative
wealth effect that decreases consumption and leisure. Hence, it increases labour supply
and decreases wages. The increase in the marginal product of capital, allowed by the
increase in labour, causes also a positive reaction of investment. Baxter and King (1993)
also show the differences obtained in the impulse responses depending on whether fiscal
policy shocks are permanent or temporary; whether spending is financed by lump-sum
or distortionary taxes; and whether the production function is augmented by public
capital. Although the implications of such modifications of the standard model are im-
portant and we analyze them in the next section, the subsequent negative wealth effect
of public spending is always at work. The empirical literature, mainly using vector-
autoregressions (VAR), initially supported these claims. In particular empirical studies
aiming at studying the effects of fiscal policy shocks confronted great difficulties in identi-
fying such shocks, as they ought to be able to distinguish the role of automatic stabilisers
responding to business cycles from the effects of discretionary fiscal policies. Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) introduced the dummy-variable or narrative approach, due to Hamilton
(1985), in the context of fiscal policy in a univariate setting. The methodology consists
in constructing a dummy variable that takes value one at quarters when large mili-
tary build-ups took place in the US, in order to identify episodes of discretionary fiscal
policy. Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) extended this methodology to a mul-
tivariate context, and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), as well as Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2005) made some modifications. Despite slight methodological differences,
all these studies generally reached the same conclusions, at least from a qualitative point
of view: in response to a discretionary substantial positive government spending shock,
output increases, consumption and wages decline, non-residential investment rises, while
residential investment falls. Therefore, at least qualitatively, these findings support the
neoclassical business cycle literature. Within the field of RBC models, Edelberg, Eichen-
baum and Fisher (1999), in addition to their econometric analysis, also built a variant
of the neoclassical growth model distinguishing between residential and non-residential
investment to match their empirical findings. Instead, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2004) introduced habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment
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to better mimic the timing and quantitative responses of hours worked, investment and
consumption. In the meantime, empirical studies aiming at detecting the effects of gov-
ernment spending shocks began to make use of structural autoregressions in order to
trace the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables of interest. Fatas and Mihov
(2001) found that there is a strong, positive e persistent impact of fiscal expansions on
economic activity. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) achieved identification by relying on in-
stitutional information about the tax collection, constructing the automatic response of
fiscal variables to the business cycle and, by implication, identifying discretionary fiscal
policy shocks. The Blanchard-Perotti approach yields a positive effect of a government
spending shock on output and consumption and negative effect on investment. While
these findings are perfectly reasonable in a Keynesian world, they are difficult to recon-
cile with the RBC literature. Perotti (2005) extended the structural VAR methodology
to other countries and reached similar conclusions. At the same time, Perotti (2007)
proposed a variant of the narrative approach that allows the responses to each Ramey-
Shapiro episode to have both a different intensity and a different shape. In addition,
the author introduced a different method to build the dummy variable, which allows to
isolate the abnormal fiscal events and to estimate the normal dynamic response of the
non-fiscal variables to these events. Using this methodology the response of consump-
tion is positive, in line with the structural VAR approach. Mountford and Uhlig (2008)
extended Uhlig (2005)’s sign-restriction approach to fiscal policy and found a negative
response of investment to a fiscal expansion. However, they found a small response of
consumption, significant only on impact. In order to match the most recent empirical
findings, the theoretical literature began working on models, able to explain the positive
response of consumption to a fiscal expansion. Linneman (2006) used a non-additively
separable utility function within a neoclassical growth model that is able to mimic a pat-
tern for consumption similar to the one found by the structural VAR literature. Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) assumed habit persistence on the consumption of in-
dividual differentiated goods, which implies a countercyclical mark-up of price over the
marginal cost. A government spending shocks has a negative wealth effect. However, the
government shock boosts aggregate demand, firms reduce their mark-up, labour demand
increases and offsets the negative income effect affecting labour supply. As a result,
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wages and consumption rise. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) casted fiscal policy
into a new-Keynesian sticky-price model modified to allow for the presence of rule-of-
thumb behaviour. Non-Ricardian households are key for the purposes of the model, as
they partly insulate aggregate demand from the negative wealth effects generated by the
higher levels of current and future taxes needed to finance the fiscal expansion.
This chapter surveys the most recent theoretical and empirical studies that investigate
the effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy. In order to be able to compare, also from
a quantitative point of view, the predictions of the neoclassical and of the new-Keynesian
models in the case of a fiscal expansion, we replicate the neoclassical RBC framework
due to Baxter and King (1993) and the new-Keynesian model due to Gali, Lopez-Salido
and Valles (2007) and trace impulses responses computed with the DYNARE toolkit,
after taking a first-order linear approximation of the models around the steady state.
For the purpose of comparability we prefer to depict percentage deviations from steady
state, as opposed to commodity units, used instead by Baxter and King.
In analysing the new-Keynesian framework, we reach the conclusion that imperfect
labour markets are a very useful addition to the baseline model as otherwise the possi-
bility of crowding-in of consumption emerges only with an implausibly high proportion
of non-Ricardian households. In other words, with perfectly competitive labour markets
empirical findings would be matched only assuming that about three fourths of house-
holds in the economy do not save or invest. Whereas, imperfect labour markets, by
implying countercyclical wage mark-ups and hence additional room for a simultaneous
increase in consumption and hours worked, allow obtaining crowding-in of consumption
also with a proportion of rule-of-thumb households of about one fourth.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the effects
of fiscal policy in the neoclassical RBC framework and performs several impulse-response
exercises. Section 1.3 surveys more recent theoretical contributions. Section 1.4 analyses
the effects of fiscal policy in the new-Keynesian framework. Section 1.5 compares several
identification methods in VAR models aiming at unveiling the effects of discretionary
fiscal policy shocks. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Fiscal policy in the neoclassical general equilibrium
model
The context of a quantitatively restricted dynamic model, such as Baxter and King
(1993), is useful to answer four classic questions:
1. Does an increase in government purchases lead to a more than one-to-one increase
in output?
2. How do the effects of a permanent shock differ from those of a temporary shock?
3. How does the introduction of distortionary taxes as opposed to lump-sum taxes
alter the results?
4. How is the analysis altered by the introduction of public capital?
1.2.1 Model and equilibrium conditions
In the model, private capital evolves according to the following equation:
Kt+1 = It + [1− δK ]Kt (1.1)
where Kt is the stock of private capital, It is private investment and δK is the depreciation
rate of capital.
The economy faces the following overall resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (1.2)
where Yt is total output, Ct is private consumption and Gt is government purchases.
In the case of distortionary taxes, the government budget constraint is:
Gt = τtYt − TRt (1.3)
where τt is the tax rate and TRt is government transfers. Gt ≡ GBt + IGt . GBt denotes
basic government purchases and IGt denotes government investment. Combining the
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previous equations, the following holds:
Yt(1− τt) = Ct + It + TRt (1.4)
Analogously to private capital, public capital evolves according to:
KGt+1 = I
G
t + [1− δK ]KGt (1.5)
The equilibrium conditions are derived from the optimisation problems of households
and firms. The representative household chooses Ct, Nt, and Kt+1 subject to the budget





βs{[ln(Ct+s + θL ln(1−N)t+s]− λt+s[Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
+ TRt − [wtNt + qtkt]}








Finally, the FOC wrt Kt+1 is:
λt = βEt {λt+1[1− δ + qt+1]} (1.8)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier.










where At is total factor productivity.
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The firm’s profits are:
Πt = (1− τt)Yt − wtNt − qtKt
where wt is the real wage and qt is the cost of capital.










Most simulations in Baxter and King (1983) are carried out with lump-sum taxes.
Moreover, if we are not concerned with transfers, the government resource constraint
(1.3) becomes simply:
Gt = Tt (1.12)
Hence, an increase in government purchases is reflected in an equal increase in taxes.1
In the case of lump-sum taxes, profits are:
Πt = Yt − wtNt − qtKt (1.13)










1.2.2 The steady state
At the steady state, great ratios are calibrated using stylized facts of the US economy:
1In the system of linearized equations we do not need to include the above equation since there is no
tax rate do be determined and we know that taxes are equals to government expenditures at each and
every period.
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• From equation (1.1): IY = δK
K
Y .






Y . We distinguish two cases:
if I
G
Y = 0 (no public capital) then
G





Y = 0.05 to match historical experience in post-war period.
• From the Euler equation: β = 11+r where 1+r = q+1−δ (r = 0.065, annual rate);
therefore q = r + δ.
• From equation (1.7): YK =
r+δ
(1−τ)θK .




• θN = 0.58, θK = 0.42, δK = 0.10, L = 0.8, N = 1− L = 0.2.
1.2.3 The linearized model
Below, the system of linearized equilibrium conditions is summarized. A hat over a
variable indicates its percentage deviation from its steady-state value.
Let us start with the case of distortionary taxes.
The FOC wrt consumption is:
−ĉt = λ̂t (1.16)
The FOC wrt labour:
N
1−N
N̂t = ŵt + λ̂t (1.17)
The production function becomes:
Ŷt = Ât + θKK̂t + θN N̂t + θGK̂Gt (1.18)




Ît + (1− δ)K̂t (1.19)
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The linearised Euler equation is:
r
1 + r
r̂t+1 + λ̂t+1 = λ̂t (1.21)







r̂t + K̂t (1.22)




τ̂t = N̂t + ŵt (1.23)











ˆTRt − τ̂t (1.24)
Therefore, in the case of distortionary taxes and no public capital, in the system there
are 9 equations in 9 unknowns: Ct, Yt, It, Nt, rt, wt, λt, τ,Kt. The equations are (1.16)
to (1.24). In all the experiment we set TR = 0. In the first experiments, we assume
that I
G
Y = 0; in the last experiment (increase in public capital) we set
IG
Y = 0.05. The




ÎGt + (1− δ)K̂Gt (1.25)












In the case of lump sum taxes and no public capital, there are 8 equations in 8
unknowns in the system: Ct, Yt, It, Nt, rt, wt, λt,Kt. The equations are (1.16) to (1.21)




r̂t + K̂t (1.27)
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Linearising the FOC wrt L (equation 1.15) yields:
Ŷt = N̂t + ŵt (1.28)
In the case of lump sum taxes and public capital, the system contains 9 equations in
9 unknowns: Ct, Yt, It, Nt, rt, wt, λt,Kt,KGt . The equations are (1.16)-(1.21) plus (1.27),
(1.28) and (1.25).
1.2.4 A permanent increase in government purchases
The increase in government purchases can be analyzed in a static and dynamic context.
In the static setting, with lump-sum taxes, disposable income is Yd = Y −T , where T
is the lump-sum taxes. Therefore, if G increase, Yd decreases by the same amount and,
as long as consumption and leisure are not inferior goods, they decrease. In symbols:
G ↑=⇒ T ↑=⇒ Ya ↓=⇒ C and l ↓=⇒ Ls ↑ (=⇒ w ↓) (1.29)
where l is leisure, Ls stands for labour supply and w stands for real wage. In the
static setting the substituion effect (if wage decreases, the price of leisure decreases and
therefore leisure should increase) is not working. This is justified by the fact that in
the neoclassical model steady-state real wage does not depend on labour income. In
addition, in the static setting, an increase in G increases Y, but less than proportionally
(the multiplier of government spending is less than 1).
In the dynamic setting, the permanent change in government purchases has again a
negative wealth effect on private individuals, as their income decreases. However, in this
case the crucial difference lies in the amplification effect of capital, which cannot occur
in a static setting. Continuing the mechanism described in equation (1.29):
Ls ↑=⇒MPk ↑, rk ↑,=⇒ I ↑ (1.30)
In Figure 1.1, we depict the impulse responses of a one-percent permanent increase in
government purchases financed by lump-sum taxes. On the x-axis we represent years,
while on the y-axis we report percentage deviations from steady state.
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Consumption and leisure permanently decrease due to the permanent reduction in
lifetime wealth. A partial recovery in consumption is made possible by a larger stock
of capital which increases output and partially offset the reduction in wealth at a later
stage.
Labour permanently increases, although on impact the increase is greater both be-
cause of the stronger initial negative income effect and because of the sharp impact
increase in the real interest rate which encourages postponement of consumption and
enables the investment boom to take place.
The real interest rate, is high but declining along the transition path (see the Euler
equation, where ct decreases). Its sharp initial increase is due to the increase in the
marginal product of capital, in turn allowed by the the increase in employment. In the
long run the the capital-labour ratio is unchanged and the same applies to the wage-rental
ratio.
Investment increases permanently as a higher level of capital stock has to be main-
tained, after the investment boom.
Wage decreases on impact as a consequence of the increase in labour supply. However,
as capital-labour ratio and the wage-rental ratio go back to the steady state values, it
returns to steady state.
Output permanently increases. In the dynamic setting the multiplier is greater than
one and the amplification effect is due to capital accumulation.
1.2.5 A temporary increase in government purchases financed by lump-
sum taxes
In this experiment, the increase in government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes;
this increase lasts 4 years. The dynamic response is broken into two phases:
1. While the shock is occurring, private consumption, leisure and investment are
reduced because of the increased government absorption of resources. In symbols:
the shock:G ↑=⇒ T ↑=⇒ Ya ↓=⇒ C, l and I ↓=⇒ Ls ↑ (1.31)
2. When the shock has ended, investment is above the long-run level because the
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economy needs to rebuild the capital stock. Private consumption and leisure are
low along all the transition path while labour input increases more in the initial
phase than it does along the transition path. In symbols:
the shock is over:I ↑ .Along the transition pathC and l ↑, L ↓ (1.32)
This is due to the fact that when the shock has ended, taxes are reduced and dis-
posable income increases: consumption evolves smoothly because of the permanent
income hypothesis, leisure increases and labour decreases.
Impulse responses are depicted in Figure 1.2. The factor prices move in opposite
directions: w ↓ and rk ↑ since labour input is high and capital is low during both phases.
The pattern of interest rate is similar to that observed for permanent changes. Compared
to the permanent change in G, the impact effect on output is smaller for the temporary
change: the impact effect of temporary purchases is smaller the shorter is the duration
of the spending shock.2
1.2.6 A temporary increase in government purchases financed by dis-
tortionary taxes
In this experiment, the government finances current expenditures from current distor-
tionary tax revenues; the revenue from the output tax is equal to expenditures on a
period-by-period basis. The path of transfer payment is constant (the analysis would be
more complicated otherwise).
In this case the increase in G financed by a corresponding increase in the tax rate
reduces individual’s incentive to work and invest, therefore reducing the tax base. As a
result, the tax rate must increase by more than ∆G/Y to finance the increase in G. In
symbol:
G ↑=⇒ τ ↑=⇒ the incentive to work and invest ↓=⇒ Y ↓=⇒ τ ↑ (1.33)
As in the previous section, the case of a four-year shock is considered, but now the
2Barro (1981) and Hall (1980) obtained the opposite result because the substitution effect between
leisure and consumption prevails in their model.
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change in government purchases is financed by current distortionary taxation. There is
a strong incentive to substitute intertemporally work effort (i.e. to postpone labour) and
to reduce investment during this period. We can distinguish two phases:
1. During the first phase:
G ↑=⇒ τ ↑=⇒ L, I, C andY ↓ (1.34)
2. During the second phase, when the shock has ended:
L, I, C andY ↑ (1.35)
The tax distortion has a strong negative effect, compared to the case analysed in the
previous section. The distortionary effect of taxes induces a reduction of labour and
output which does not occur in the case of lump-sum taxes. According to Baxter and
King, the poor timing of tax distortions would be avoided by taxation smoothing over
time and the related use of public debt for financing temporary high purchases.
In Figure 1.3 we report the responses of the principal macroeconomic variables:
Labour decreases during shock-time, since wage is taxed more and hence is optimal
to postpone it. Then it immediately shifts upwards when the shock is over to smoothly
go back to steady state. Here the substitution effect prevails over the income effect.
Output follows closely what happens to labour.
The tax rate has to increase more than the increase in government/output ratio and
continues to grow as output decline to allow a balanced budget.
Consumption decreases during the occurrence of the shock given decreasing income
to recover after the shock is over.
Wages and the real interest rates reflect the path of output.
Investment declines during the shock both because of the absorption of resources by
government spending and because of low rates of return. Hence the negative effect here
is amplified.
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1.2.7 A permanent increase in public investment
As evident from the production function, an increase in government capital works like a
productivity shock. Baxter and King distinguish between short-run and long-run effect
of public investment.
In the long-run the effect of KG on output depends on: (i) the direct effect of higher
KG, holding private capital and labour fixed; (ii) a supply-side effect due to the response
of capital and labour. When public capital in unproductive, θG = 0 and the results are
the same as in the previous experiments. As the productivity parameter, θG, increases,
there are larger direct effects. When θG = 0.4 the direct output effect is eight times the
change in public investment; therefore there is a high amplification effect (Baxter and
King 1993, page 330).
In the short-run three forces operate along the transition path to the new steady
state:
1. there is a government absorption of resource, as in the previous cases.
2. As KG increases, the flow of output increases.




and MPL = θN YtNt ). Therefore capital and labour increase: the return to
investment, MPk, is higher, hence more capital is accumulated.
If KG increases, the resources available for private consumption and investment de-
crease; this loss equal the shift in public investment (force 1 ). With variable private
capital and labour, force 3 operates and it has significant effects, i.e. the response of
output is strongly amplified by the increase in KG. Therefore, the effects of increasing
public capital depend strongly on whether this change directly affects private marginal
products.
In figure 1.4 we report the responses of the principal macroeconomic variables.
Consumption and leisure decrease due to the reduction in wealth. In later years,
the steady additional supply of labour and capital stimulates output, and therefore con-
sumption increases.
Labour increases as leisure decreases and the marginal product of labour increases.
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Private investment permanently increases because its marginal product has increased.
The return to investment is higher, hence more capital is accumulated.
Output follows closely what happens to investment in a larger scale, due to the
increase in public capital.
The real interest rate is high but declining along the transition path. Its initial
increase is due to the increase in the marginal product of capital, in turn allowed by the
the increase in employment.
Wage decreases on impact as a consequence of the increase in labour supply; then it
increases.
1.3 Advances in the recent theoretical literature
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) conduct an empirical analysis in order to
build a theoretical model consistent with their empirical findings. Their empirical strat-
egy is based on the narrative approach previously utilised by Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
who identify exogenous government shocks by indentifying political events that led to
large military buildups.Their main empirical finding is that an expansionary shock in
government purchases causes an increase in output, hours worked and nonresidential
investment, whereas real wages, residential investment and consumption of durables and
nondurables decrease.3 To match their empirical findings, they build a simple variant
of the neoclassical growth model distinguishing between residential and nonresidential
investment. Nonresidential investment augments capital used to produce goods, whereas
residential investment augments capital that yields consumption services. In their theo-
retical model, a persistent positive shock to government purchases, financed by lump-sum
taxes, reduces the representative agent’s permanent income, which in turn induces a fall
in consumption of durables and nondurables and an increase in employment. As a result,
the marginal product of labour and real wages fall. The fall in residential investment
is due to the reduction in consumption of durables (consumption services), whereas the
increase in nonresidential investment is due to the complementarity of hours worked
and market capital. An increase in output accommodates the increase in government
purchases.
3Section 1.5 covers the various estimation strategies to identify fiscal shocks in the empirical literature.
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Although Baxter and King have shown that, when taxes are distortionary, a positive
fiscal shock reduces both hours worked and after-tax real wages, Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Fisher (2004), adopting the empirical narrative approach, find that government
purchases increase tax rates on labor and income, but hours worked persistently rise. In
addition, they test two different theoretical neoclassical models subject to the sequences
of changes in government purchases and tax rates equal to their point estimates obtained
with the empirical narrative approach. The first model corresponds to the standard
neoclassical growth model, whereas in the second model they introduce habit formation
in consumption and adjustment costs in investment. Allowing for distortionary taxes,
the standard neoclassical model is able to reproduce all the qualitative features of their
empirical responses following a fiscal policy shock: a rise in government purchases, hours
worked and investment and a fall in consumption and real wages. There are, however,
some shortcomings: hours worked counterfactually rise close to the time of the fiscal
shock and the quantitative responses of consumption and investment are overstated.
Allowing for habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment, they
are able to better mimic the timing of how hours worked respond to a fiscal shock
and to improve the quantitative responses of investment and consumption, although the
theoretical model has to rely on quite a high labour elasticity.
King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) have shown the conditions under which the utility
function satisfies the long run restrictions implied by the basic neoclassical growth model
i.e. continuing trend growth of labor productivity and no trend growth in per capita la-
bor supply. A utility function that allows offsetting substitution and income effect in
labor supply in the long run must be either logarithmic in consumption (and additively
separable in consumption and leisure) with a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution
or non additively separable with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution smaller than
one. Linneman (2006) uses a non additively separable utility function and, under a plau-
sible calibration, is able to build a neoclassical growth model which can show a pattern
for consumption similar to the recent structural VAR literature, surveryed in section 1.3.
A government spending shock implies a negative wealth effect which reduces leisure. The
non-additively separable utility function implies that consumption and leisure are substi-
tutes. The reduction in leisure increases the marginal utility of consumption, and if the
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complementarity between consumption and employment is strong enough, consumption
can increase after a fiscal spending shock.
Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006), in contrast to standard habit-persistence
models – where households are assumed to form habits from consumption on a single
aggregate good – assume that habits are formed from the consumption of individual
goods. Such an assumption has a key implication for the supply side of the economy.
With imperfectly competitive product markets, the higher is the current demand for
a particular good, the higher will be the demand in the future via habit formation,
implying a countercyclical mark-up of price over marginal cost. In other words, since in
the model the demand faced by an individual firm has an elastic component linked to
the aggregate demand and an inelastic component linked to habits, an increase in the
aggregate demand makes the price-elastic component of the demand predominant and
leads the firm to cut the mark-up. At the same time, the current reduction in the mark-
up induces agents to form habits that the firm will later exploits at a higher mark-up. A
government spending shock makes agents poorer and they will consequently work more.
However, the government shock boosts aggregate demand. Therefore, firms will reduce
their mark-up, which in turn induces an expansion in labor demand, which offsets the
negative income effect affecting labor supply. As a result, real wages and consumption
rise.
1.4 Fiscal policy in the new-Keynesian framework
As we have seen in section 1.2, the standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model generally
predicts a decline in consumption in response to a rise government purchases. In con-
strast, the IS-LM model predicts that consumption should rise, amplifying the effects of
the expansion in government spending on output.
The reason for such a differential impact across the two models lies on how consumers
are assumed to behave. In fact, the RBC model features infinitely-lived Ricardian house-
holds who base their consumption decisions at any point in time on an intertemporal
budget constraint. On the contrary, in the IS-LM model consumers behave in a non-
Ricardian fashion, i.e. their consumption is a function of their current disposable income
and not of their life-time resources. In the latter model, the implied effect of an increase
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in government spending will depend critically on how spending itself is financed: the
multiplier will be an increasing function of the extent of deficit financing.
As we document in section 1.5, some recent empirical contributions find a positive
response of consumption to an expansionary shock in government purchases. Gaĺı, López-
Salido, and Valles (2007) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that is able to
account for that evidence. In particular, they cast fiscal policy into a new-Keynesian
sticky-price model modified in order to allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour
by a fraction of households. Consistently with Campbell and Mankiw (1989), they
assume that rule-of-thumb consumers do not borrow or save: they are simply assumed
to consume their current income fully and coexist with conventional infinite-horizon
Ricardian consumers. This assumption is motivated by an extensive empirical literature
that provided evidence of excessive dependence of consumption on current income.4
In order to obtain a positive response of consumption to a rise in government spend-
ing, the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers is complemented with the presence of sticky
prices in goods markets. To see that such an assumption is necessary, consider the fol-
lowing equilibrium condition in logarithmic terms:
mpnt = µt + ct + ϕnt (1.36)
where mpnt is the marginal product of labour, ct is consumption, nt is hours worked and
ϕ > 0 measures the curvature of the marginal disutility of labour. ct+ϕnt represents the
log marginal rate of substitution. Hence µt is the wedge between the marginal rate of
substitution and the marginal product of labour. Gaĺı, López-Salido, and Vallés (2004)
show that µt is the sum of the log wage and price mark-ups. If µt = µ ∀t (µ = 0
in the neoclassical RBC framework), an increase in government purchases raises hours
and lowers the marginal product of labour, hence consumption must drop. Therefore,
a necessary condition for consumption to rise, in response to a fiscal expansion, is that
there must be a simultaneous decline the wedge µt, which occurs if prices are sticky in
the goods markets.
4See Campbell and Mankiw (1989) for a survey.
1.4 Fiscal policy in the new-Keynesian framework 19
1.4.1 Model and equilibrium conditions
In the model, a fraction 1− λ of households have access to capital markets and can buy
and sell physical capital which they can rent out to firms. These households are referred
to as optimizing or Ricardian. A fraction λ of households just consume their labour
income. They are referred to as rule-of-thumb.







































t − PtTOt (1.38)
and the law of capital accumulation:




















t , δ are real wages, the price of the
final good, hours of work of optimising households, capital holdings rented to firms, the
quantity of nominal one-period bonds carried over from period t− 1, the gross nominal
return on bonds purchased in period t, dividends from ownership of firms, lump-sum
taxes from this type of households, their consumption, their investment expenditures, the





KOt determines the change in
the capital stock induced by investment spending. The function φ (·) introduces capital
adjustment costs. Further assumptions are: φ′ > 0, φ′′ ≤ 0, φ′ (δ) = 1, φ (δ) = δ, ϕ ≤ 0.
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Combining (1.41) and (1.42) yields:
Wt = COt N
Oϕ
t (1.43)












































5The authors present two versions of the model: one with competitive labour markets, one with
wages set by unions. Below we will present the results obtained with non-competitive labour markets.
This assumption can be removed by using equation (1.43) and the analogous condition for rule-of-thumb
households.
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t − PtT rt (1.50)
Therefore, the level of consumption will equate net labour income:
Crt = WtN
r
t − T rt (1.51)




In order to obtain the aggregate level of consumption, hours, investment and the
stock of capital, we simply take a weighted average across the two types of households:
Ct ≡ λCrt + (1− λ)COt (1.53)
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Nt ≡ λN rt + (1− λ)NOt (1.54)
It ≡ (1− λ) IOt (1.55)
Kt ≡ (1− λ)KOt (1.56)
In order to introduce wage-setting in the model, a continuum of unions can be as-
sumed, each of which represents workers of a certain type. Labour input hired by firm j









where εw is the elasticity of substitution across different types of households. The fraction
of rule-of-thumb and Ricardian consumers is uniformly distributed across unions. Hence,
a typical union, representing worker type z, sets the wage for its workers in order to
























In the objective function, the union weighs labour income with the marginal utilities of
consumption of the two types of households as their consumption will generally differ. As
firms allocate labour demand uniformly across different workers of type z, independently
of their household type, in aggregate N rt = N
O
t = Nt. Invoking symmetry, the FOC of








Wt = µw (1.57)











w = εwεw−1 .
On the firms’ side, in line with new-Keynesian models, there is a continuum of
monipolistically competitive firms producing differentiated intermediate goods used by
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a representative perfectly competitive firm producing a single final good.










where Xt (j) is the quantity of intermediate good j used as input and εp > 1. Hence the














Taking the final good price Pt and the intermediate good prices Pt (j) as given, the FOC
















The production function for a typical intermediate good firm is:
Yt (j) = Kt(j)αNt(j)1−α (1.62)
Taking wages and the rental cost of capital as given, the Lagrangian for the cost min-
imisation problem is:
L = WtNt(j) +RktKt(j)− λt
(
Kt(j)αNt(j)1−α − ¯Y (j)
)
(1.63)
The FOC wrt Nt is:













1.4 Fiscal policy in the new-Keynesian framework 24











The Lagrange multiplier λt represents the real marginal cost:








Substituting for (1.66), the marginal cost turns out to be common to all firms:
MCt = Ψ(Rkt )
α(Wt)1−α (1.68)
where Ψ = α−α(1− α)−(1−α).
Intermediate goods producers set nominal prices according to the stochastic time
dependent rule proposed by Calvo (1983). Each period a measure 1 − θ of producers
reset their prices, while a measure θ keep their prices unchanged.














subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:





































where µp ≡ εpεp−1 is the gross frictionless mark-up.
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The price index is described in equation (1.61). However, in equilibrium, each pro-
ducer that chooses a new price Pt(z) in period t will chose the same price Pt(z) and the











The central bank is assumed to set the nominal interest rate rt ≡ Rt − 1 according
to a simple Taylor rule:
rt = r + φππt (1.74)
where φπ > 1 to satisfy the Taylor principle.
The government budget constraint is:
PtTt +R−1t Bt+1 = Bt + PtGt (1.75)
where Tt ≡ λT rt + (1− λ)TOt . Fiscal policy follows the following rule:
tt = φbbt + φggt (1.76)
where φb and φg are positive constant, tt ≡ Tt−TT , gt ≡
Gt−G






government purchases (also in deviations from steady state and normalised by steady
state output) evolve exogenously according to a first-order autoregressive process:
gt = ρggt−1 + εt (1.77)
where ρg ∈ (0, 1) and εt is an i.i.d. shock with constant variance σ2ε .
1.4.2 Linearised equilibrium conditions
To solve the model and trace impulse responses of fiscal policy shocks, we need to linearise
the model equilibrium conditions around the steady state and build a linear system of
dynamic stochastic equations. We represent percentage deviations from steady state
with a hat on the variable of interest and steady states with variables with no subscripts.
Let us start from households’ optimality conditions. It is useful to note that the
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elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s Q, from (1.47) is:
η = − 1δφ′′(δ) . Hence, linearising (1.47) and taking the assumptions made on φ(·) into
account, the relationship between Tobin’s Q and investment is given by the following:
ît − k̂t = ηq̂t (1.78)
Linearising the capital accumulation equation (1.39) yields:
k̂t+1 = δît + (1− δ)k̂t (1.79)
Substituting for the definition of the stochastic discount factor (1.45) into the Euler
equation (1.44), linearising the latter around the steady state and noting that R−1 = β,
yields the linearised Euler equation for optimizing households:
ĉOt = Et[ĉ
O
t+1]− (r̂t − Et[πt+1]) (1.80)
where πt+1 = p̂t+1 − p̂t = log(Pt+1/P )− log(Pt/P ) = log(Pt+1/Pt) ≈ Pt+1−PtPt represents
inflation.
To obtain a linear expression describing the dynamics of Tobin’s Q, note that, at the
steady state, (1.48) implies β−1 = R = RK + (1 − δ). Then, linearising (1.48) around
the steady state and substituting for (1.78) and (1.80) yields:
q̂t = βEt[q̂t+1 + [1− β(1− δ)]Et[r̂Kt+1]− (rt − Et[πt+1])] (1.81)
Linearising the level of consumption of rule-of-thumb households (1.51) yields:
ĉrt = (WN
r/Cr)(ŵt + n̂rt )− (Y/Cr)trt (1.82)
where tt ≡ Tt−TT as previously defined.
To simplify the algebra, we can assume that Cr = CO = C. As marginal rates of
substitutions are equal across households, equality of steady state consumption also
implies N r = NO = N .6 Using this assumption, linearising equations (1.53) and (1.54)
6Since the focus of impulse-response analysis is the differential response to shocks, this assumption is
largely innocuous.
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yields expressions for aggregate consumption and employment in percentage deviations
from steady state:
ĉt = λĉrt + (1− λ) ĉOt (1.83)
n̂t = λn̂rt + (1− λ) n̂Ot (1.84)
Linearising equation (1.57) yields the wage schedule:
ŵt = χrm̂rsrt + χOm̂rs
O
t = c̃t + ϕ(χr + χO)n̂t (1.85)
where χr = λW/MRSrµw, χO = (1− λ)W/MRSOµw, and c̃t = χr ĉrt + χO ĉOt . Provided
that tax policy is such that steady state consumption is the same across households,
MRSr = MRSO, χr = λ and χO = 1− λ. Therefore, the following holds:
ŵt = ĉt + φn̂t (1.86)
On the firms’s side, a linerised version of the aggregate production function can be
derived by noticing that, in order to aggregate the output of producers of intermediate









However, in a neighbourhood of the steady state, we can approximate equation (1.87)









0 Kt(j)dj and Nt =
∫ 1
0 Nt(j)dj. Linearising the above equation yields:
ŷt = (1− α)n̂t + αk̂t (1.87)
To obtain a linearised expression of the price mark-up, note that in general the gross
price mark-up is the inverse of the marginal cost: µpt = MC
−1
t , which can be linearised
1.4 Fiscal policy in the new-Keynesian framework 28




which can be linearised as:
r̂Kt = m̂ct + ŷ − k̂t
and rearranged as:
µ̂t = (ŷt − k̂)− r̂Kt (1.88)
Equivalently and analogously:
µ̂t = (ŷt − n̂)− ŵt (1.89)
To obtain the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, describing the dynamics of inflation as
a function of percentage deviations of the average markup from its steady state level, it
is convenient to first linearise equation (1.72) around the steady state:
p̂t = θp̂t−1 + (1− θ)p̂∗t






























Substituting for p̂∗t and using the properties of first-order stochastic difference equations,








Some algebraic manipulations yield the following:
π̂t = βπ̂t+1 − λpµ̂t (1.90)
where λp = (1− βθ)(1− θ)θ−1.
Market clearing requires Yt = Ct+ It+Gt, which, expressed in percentage deviations
from steady state, becomes:
ŷt = γcĉt + γiît + gt (1.91)
where γc = C/Y , γi = I/Y and gt represents the deviation of government purchases
from steady state, normalised by steady state output.
Linearising the government budget constraint (1.74) around the steady state with
zero debt and balanced primary budget, and substituting for the fiscal policy rule (1.75)
yields the following linear expression describing the dynamics of government debt:
bt+1 = (1 + ρ)(1− φb)bt + (1 + ρ)(1− φg)gt (1.92)
where R = 1 + ρ = β−1 and φb >
ρ
1+ρ in order to ensure non-explosive debt dynamics.
Equations (1.78) to (1.83), (1.86) to (1.92) in addition to the Taylor rule (1.74),
the fiscal policy rule (1.76) and the process for the exogenous government purchases
(1.77) form a system of 16 linear dynamic equations in 15 endogenous variables and one
exogenous variable. Assuming n̂rt = n̂
O
t = n̂t and trt = tt, the endogenous variables are:
ŷt, ĉt, ĉOt , ĉ
r
t , ît, k̂t, q̂t, n̂t, ŵt, r̂t, r̂
k
t , µ̂t, πt, bt and tt. k̂t and bt are predetermined and
gt is exogenous.
1.4.3 Impulse-response analysis
The system described above can be used to analyse the dynamic responses of the principal
macroeconomic variables to a shock to government purchases. Following Gaĺı, López-
Salido, and Valles (2007), we calibrate model parameters to match the US experience.















ρ β−1 − 1
λp (1− βθ)(1− θ)θ−1



















Table 1.1: Parameter calibration for the new-Keynesian framework (Source: Gaĺı, López-
Salido, and Valles (2007)).
Parameter values are summarized in Table 1.1.7
In Figure 1.5, we depict the effects that a positive shock in government purchases
has on the principal macroeconomic variables. We normalise the size of the shock to a 1
percent of steady state output.
We use the baseline calibration as in Gaĺı, López-Salido, and Valles (2007), and
report the results obtained using non-competitive labour markets. In fact, with com-
petitive labour markets, a positive response in consumption can be obtained only with
implausibly high values of the proportion of rule-of-thumb households (about 3/4). This
would imply that 3/4 of households in the economy, for some reason, should not be able
to save or invest. On the contrary, when imperfect labour markets are assumed, the
possibility of crowding-in of consumption emerges for values of λ above a threshold of
about 1/4. This is due to the fact that imperfect labour markets imply countercyclical
wage mark-ups, which in turn provides additional room for a simultaneous increase in
7Some parameters are estimated by the authors using VAR techniques, others are taken from the
relevant literature, the remaining values are computed, combining the expressions for steady state values.
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consumption and hours. Therefore, in order for both the assumptions and the predic-
tions of the model to be plausible, we believe that imperfect labour markets, together
with monopolistic competition in the intermediate good market – which in turn causes
price-stickiness – and the presence of a fraction of rule-of-thumb households should all be
important features of a DSGE model aiming at matching the recent empirical evidence
of a positive comovement of private consumption and government spending.
Gaĺı, López-Salido, and Valles (2007) show how the extent of the crowding-in effect
of consumption increases with λ, reflecting the offsetting role of rule-of-thumb behaviour
on the conventional negative wealth and intertemporal substitution effects triggered by
the fiscal expansion. The presence of non-Ricardian households is key for the purposes
of the model, as they partly insulate aggregate demand from the negative wealth effects
generated by the higher levels of current and future taxes needed to finance the fiscal
expansion, while making it more sensitive to current disposable income.
Figure 1.5 shows that the response of output and consumption is systematically above
that generated by the neoclassical model, presented in the previous sections. In addition,
the increase in aggregate hours coexists with an increase in real wages. This response of
wages is made possible by sticky-prices. In fact, even in the face of a drop in the marginal
product of labour, real wages can increase as the price mark-up may adjust sufficiently
downward to absorb the resulting gap. The combined effect of higher real wages and
higher employment raises labour income and stimulates consumption of rule-of-thumb
households. Investment presents a typical hump-shaped response. Debt-dynamics, in
the baseline calibration, allows a lagged response of taxes to the shock in spending hence
the response of the deficit, on impact, is almost one-to-one with expenditures.
1.5 The effects of fiscal shocks in VAR models
1.5.1 The recursive approach
Within a broad comparative analysis on several estimation strategies that can be found in
the empirical literature on fiscal policy, Caldara and Kamps (2008) include the recursive
approach.
More generally, colleting the endogenous variables in a k-dimensional vector Xt, a
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reduced-form VAR model can be expressed as:
Xt = µ0 + µ1t+A (L)Xt−1 + ut (1.93)
where µ0 is a constant, t is a linear time trend, A (L) is a polynomial in the lag op-







= Σu. As the reduced-form disturbances are, in general, correlated, it is neces-
sary to transform the reduced-form model into a structural model. The structural form
is obtained by pre-multiplying equation (1) by the (k × k) matrix A0:
A0Xt = A0µ0 +A0µ1t+A0A (L)Xt−1 +Bet (1.94)
where Bet = A0ut describes the relationship between the structural disturbances and
reduced-form disturbances. Matrix A0 describes the contemporaneous relations among
the variables in vector X. One key assumption of the structural model is that the
structural disturbances are uncorrelated, i.e. Σe is a diagonal matrix.
Without restrictions on the parameters in A0 and in B the structural model is not
identified. The recursive approach restricts B to a k-dimensional identity matrix and A0
to a lower triangular matrix with unit diagonal. These restrictions implies ut = A−10 et
and Σu = A−10 Σe
(
A−10
)′ . Identification of A0 is obtained by: (i) Cholesky decomposition
of the covariance matrix of the reduced-form disturbances Σu = PP ′ ; (ii) defining a
diagonal matrix D with the same main diagonal as P ; and (iii) specifying A−10 = PD
−1.
The elements on the main diagonal of D and P are equal to the standard deviations of
the respective structural shocks. By construction, the covariance matrix of the structural
disturbances will be diagonal. In fact A0 =
(
PD−1
)−1 = DP−1; et = A0ut = DP−1ut;
and Σe = DP−1Σu
(
DP−1
)′ = DP−1PP ′ (P ′)−1D′ = DD′, which is clearly diagonal.
The recursive approach implies a casual ordering of the model variables. There are
in total k! possible orderings. Caldara and Kamps (2008) order the variables of a VAR
estimated with US data as follows: government spending, output, inflation, tax revenue
and the interest rate. They add other variables of interest one at a time. This particular
ordering of variables captures the effects of automatic stabilizers on government revenue,
while it rules out potentially important contemporaneous effects of discretionary tax
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changes on output and inflation.
By using this identification approach, the impulse responses to a pure spending shock
are positive for taxes, positive and hump-shaped for output, consumption and wages, and
flat for hours. These empirical findings provide support for theoretical models which
generate an increase in private consumption and the real wage. However, they do not
support the increase in employment implied by many new-Keynesian DSGE models.
1.5.2 The event-study approach
The event-study or narrative approach was first used in the context of the identification
of fiscal policy shocks by Ramey and Shapiro (1998). This procedure is similar to the one
used by Hamilton (1985) for oil shocks and by Romer and Romer (1989) for monetary
shocks.
The authors use military build-ups as events of large fiscal policy shocks. To identify
exact dates, they take information from historical accounts and Business Week, which
discusses the economic details of the episodes. Military build-ups are seen as appropri-
ate examples of fiscal shocks as they occur rapidly and unexpectedly, they are driven
by imperatives of foreign policy, and they are likely to be exogenous with respect to
macroeconomic variables.
In the post-World War II period, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identify three large
build-ups: (i) the Korean War; (ii) the Vietnam War; (iii) the Carter-Regan build-up
that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In similar frameworks, Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2005) and Ramey (2008) also consider (iv) the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In terms
of exact dates, in empirical works that deal with quarterly data, the shocks occurred in
1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and 2001:3.
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use the first three of the above episodes to construct a
dummy variable that takes the value of one at the mentioned quarters and zero otherwise.
To assess the effect of a military shock on key macroeconomic variables, they estimate
univariate autoregressive models where current and lagged values of the military build-
up dummy are included as exogenous regressors. Allowing for a break in the trend
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component, the estimating equation takes the following specification:






ciDt−i + εt (1.95)
where yt is the endogenous variable, t is a linear time trend, Dt is the military build-up
dummy and εt is an error term.
The authors estimate the regression described above for a set of macroeconomic
variables. Then, they simulate the impact of an ”average” large military shock, i.e.
setting the military shock variable equal to one. The average is taken over the Korean
War, the Vietnam War and the Carter-Regan build-up. Even if the dummy variable
takes value one only three times, it has considerable explanatory power, as its inclusion
increases the regression goodness of fit, and the lags of the dummy variable are jointly
significant.
Impulse-response analysis shows that while a military build-up leads to a sustained
increase in defence purchases, non-defence purchases fall. Both total GDP and private
(less total government purchases) GDP increase in the first few quarters. Then, while
total GDP remains positive for three years, private GDP becomes negative after two
years. Immediately after the shock, durable consumption purchases rise substantially
but then turn significantly negative. In contrast, nondurable and service consumption
show a statistically significant fall after the shock. The point estimates of responses
in hours are positive, yet not statistically significant. Real wage per hour declines in
response to a military build-up. In sum, the empirical responses of key macroeconomic
variables to an exogenous fiscal policy shock are consistent with a neoclassical framework.
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) apply the event-study approach to a VAR
framework. They estimate a reduced-form VAR such as:
Xt = A (L)Xt−1 +B (L)Dt + ut (1.96)
where A (L) and B (L) are finite ordered vector polynomials in nonnegative powers of the
lag operator whose coefficients can be estimated using equation-by-equation least squares.
The response of the endogenous variables Xt+k to a unit shock to the dummy variable in
t is given by the estimate of the coefficient on Lk in the expansion of (I−A(L)L)−1B(L).
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As the dummy variable appears in all the equations of the system, this methodology
assumes that during a Ramey-Shapiro episode, not only the fiscal variable can change,
but also the dynamic response of all variables. Moreover, equation (1.96) assumes that
the shape and the size of the responses of all variables to the shock are the same in each
Ramey-Shapiro episode.
The above methodology yields results consistent with Ramey and Shapiro (1998). In
response to an exogenous fiscal policy shock, total government purchases, employment,
output, and non-residential investment rise, while real wages, residential investment, and,
after a slight delay, consumption expenditures on non-durable goods and services and
durable goods fall. These findings again support neoclassical business cycle models. In
addition, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) propose a variant of the neoclassical
growth model in which residential investment is thought as a form of investment in the
stock of durable consumption goods. They argue that this modification can account
for the finding that residential investment falls while non-residential investment rises in
response to an increase in government purchases.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) introduce a less stringent version of equa-
tion (1.96) that allows each episode to have a different intensity, though their dynamic
effects are the same up to a scale factor. Analogously to the univariate approach due
to Ramey and Shapiro (1998), they consider a VAR where they allow for a break in the
time trend component:
Zt = A0 +A1t+A2 (t ≥ 1973 : 2) +A3 (L)Zt−1 +
3∑
i=1
A4 (L)ψiDit + ut (1.97)
The ψi in (1.97) are scalars with ψ1 normalized to unity. The parameters ψ2 and ψ3
measure the intensity of the second and third Ramey-Shapiro episodes relative to the
first. These weights are obtained by comparing the percentage peak rise after the onset
of the Vietnam and the Carter-Regan defence build-up episodes to the analogous rise
after the Korea episode.
To estimate the effect of a fiscal policy shock on some other variable, the latter is
added to the list of variables in Zt. In all cases the specification of Zt includes the log
of per-capita real GDP, the log of per-capita real government purchases and average
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capital and labour income tax rates. Using post-war US data, this approach allows
identifying fiscal policy shocks that are followed by persistent declines in real wages
and rises in tax rates. Also in the case of Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), the
empirical findings are at least qualitatively consistent to a benchmark neoclassical model.
Additionally, the authors argue that incorporating habit formation in consumption and
investment adjustment costs into the model enhances its quantitative performance.
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005), use the same model as in equation (1.97) to argue
that fiscal policy in the aftermath of 9/11 is not explained as the normal response of the
US economy to a large exogenous increase in government consumption. In particular it is
difficult to explain the dramatic fall in the government surplus and the large fall in labour
and capital tax rates. Although the authors do not argue whether the decline in tax rates
and in the surplus after 9/11 were desirable or not, they use the model as in Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) to show how the economy would have responded had the
government reacted in the same way as they responded to other exogenous increases in
military spending. They argue that the effect on aggregate output and surplus would
have been small. Moreover, conditional on the observed path of government spending,
a cut in tax rates similar to those actually observed would have resulted in a slight rise
in output and a persistent decline in the government surplus. This is taken to provide
additional evidence that the observed sharp drop in the surplus to GDP ratio reflects
tax policy choices that are atypical relative to post-war US experience.
Fats and Mihov (2001) also point out the differences among the Ramey-Shapiro
episodes. Building on these accounts, Perotti (2007) proposes a variant of the narrative
approach that allows the responses to each Ramey-Shapiro episodes to have both a
different intensity and a different shape:
Xt = A (L)Xt−1 +
4∑
i=1
Bi (L)Dt + ut (1.98)
where each is an nB + 1-order vector polynomial. As Perotti points out, the approach
outlined in equation (1.98) suffers from an extreme version of a problem already present
in the previous approaches: as each dummy appears separately in all equations, the
residuals of each equation at the beginning of each of the four events are set to zero. In
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other words, it is as if the abnormal fiscal events were responsible for all the deviation
from normal of all the variables for nB + 1 quarters. Hence, the author proposes a
modified dummy-variable approach to isolate the abnormal fiscal events and to estimate
the normal dynamic response of the non-fiscal endogenous variables to these events.
Operationally, the procedure consists in including lags 0 to nB of the dummy variables
in the equations of the fiscal variables and only lag 0 in the other equations. This can be
done both in an equation such as (1.98) or in equations such as (1.96) and (1.97). Using
this methodology, the estimated normal response of consumption to abnormal events is
positive, consistently with the results obtained using a structural VAR approach.
1.5.3 The structural auto-regression approach
The Fatas-Mihov approach
Fats and Mihov (2001) first assess fiscal policy as an automatic stabilizer. By looking
at data from OECD countries in the post-war period they document that revenues are
procyclical and expenditures are acyclical. Next, they provide evidence that large gov-
ernments are associated with less volatile business cycles. Finally, they focus on US data
to construct a measure of discretionary fiscal policy via a semi-structural VAR. Their
baseline VAR contains logarithms of private output, the implicit GDP deflator, the ratio
of primary deficit to output and the nominal T-bill rate. The semi-structural framework



















Y is the set of macroeconomic variables useful to estimate the induced changes in the
budget balance. fp is a measure of the fiscal policy stance. This set of equation is
unrestricted, thus vfpt cannot be recovered without further assumptions. Identification
is achieved following Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), i.e. partitioning the vector of en-
dogenous variables into three blocks:
1. sluggish private sector variables that do not respond contemporaneously to shifts
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in taxes and transfers, but react to changes in government spending (output and
prices). Restriction on C0, B0 and Ay are imposed to ensure no response to tax
and transfers;
2. the rest of vector Y contains prices that respond immediately to any changes in
the economy. These variables are left unrestricted;
3. the fiscal policy equation (equation 1.100) is restricted not to respond to financial
markets shocks within a quarter; taxes and transfers react to the current state of
the economy; spending components do not react immediately to macroeconomic
conditions.
Via the above estimation strategy, the authors find that there is a strong, positive and
persistent impact of fiscal expansions on economic activity. Moreover, changes in taxes,
transfers and government employment are the most effective tools of fiscal policy. These
results are difficult to compare with calibrated DSGE models, as the latter do not take
into account the determinants of different components of government expenditures and
taxes.
The Blanchard-Perotti approach
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) also investigate the dynamic effects of shocks in govern-
ment spending and taxes on economic activity in the United States during the post-war
period. They use a structural VAR approach where identification is achieved by relying
on institutional information about the tax collections. This allows constructing the au-
tomatic response of fiscal variables to the business cycle and, by implication, to identify
the shocks to fiscal policy.
The main equation specification is a three-variable VAR:
Yt = A(L)Yt−1 + Ut (1.101)
where Yt = [Tt, Gt, Xt]
′ is a vector in the log of quarterly taxes, spending and GDP,
in real, per capita terms. Ut = [tt, gt, xt]
′ is the vector of the respective reduced-form
residuals, which have in general nonzero cross correlations. Four lags are used in the
VAR to take the presence of seasonal patterns in the response of some taxes.
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authors write the following system:





gt = b1xt + b2ett + e
g
t (1.102)
xt = c1tt + c2gt + ext
To identify this system a three-step procedure is used:
1. a1 and b1 are identified by noticing that using quarterly data eliminates the dis-
cretionary policy channel from economic activity to fiscal variables, because of the
typical institutional lags present in fiscal policymaking. Hence the effect of out-
put on reduced-form fiscal shocks are assumed to be due exclusively to automatic
stabilizers and are constructed as elasticities to output of government purchases
and of taxes minus tranfers. b1 is found to be zero. a1 is computed as a weighted
average of the elasticities of taxes to the their tax base times the elasticities of the
tax base to GDP.
2. With the estimates of a1 and b1, cyclically adjusted reduced-form tax and spending
residuals can be constructed: t
′
t = tt− a1xt and g
′





are not correlated with ext , they can be used as instruments to estimate the third
equation of the system.
3. In estimating a2 and b2, the issue is whether taxes respond to spending (a2 6= 0,
b2 6= 0) or the reverse. Blanchard and Perotti present results under the two opposite





sufficiently small that the ordering makes little difference to impulse responses of
output.
Impulse responses obtained with the Blanchard-Perotti approach show that a positive
government spending shock has a positive effect on output, and a positive tax shock has
a negative effect. Government spending shocks have also a positive effect on private con-
sumption. While the latter is a straightforward implication of Keynesian models, such
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a result is difficult to reconcile with neoclassical models. Yet, according to Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), both increases in taxes and increases in government spending have
a strong negative effect on private investment spending. This result is in line with a
neoclassical model with distortionary taxes, but more difficult to reconcile with a Key-
nesian view. In fact, Keynesian models predict opposite effects of tax and spending on
private investment. Perotti (2005) extends the structural VAR methodology developed
in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to study the effects of fiscal policy in five countries: the
US, West Germany, the UK, Canada and Australia. The principal conclusions of the
analysis are that: (i) the estimated effects of fiscal policy on GDP tend to be small; (ii)
there is no evidence that tax cuts work faster or have higher multipliers than spending
increases; (iii) the effects of government spending shocks and of tax cuts on GDP and
its components have become weaker over time.
1.5.4 The sign-restriction approach
Unlike the recursive approach and the Blanchard-Perotti approach, the sign-restrictions
approach does not impose linear restrictions on the contemporaneous relation between
reduced-form and structural disturbances. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) extend Uhlig
(2005)’s agnostic identification method of imposing sign restrictions on impulse response
functions and identify four shocks: (i) a business cycle shock; (ii) a monetary policy
shock; (iii) a government spending shock; and (iv) a tax shock.
They impose that the fiscal shock is orthogonal to both the business cycle shock and
to the monetary policy shock, in order to filter out the automatic responses of fiscal
variables to business cycle and monetary policy shocks. Moreover, the authors consider
macroeconomic fiscal shocks as existing in a two-dimensional space spanned by two basic
shocks: a government revenue shock and a government spending shock. They see different
fiscal policies as different linear combinations of the two basic shocks. Finally, they also
take into account the fact that there is often a lag between the announcement and the
implementation of fiscal policy and that the announcement may cause movements in
macroeconomic variables before there are movements in the fiscal variables. To address
this issue, they identify fiscal shocks also with the identifying restriction that the fiscal
variable in question does not respond for four quarters and then rises for a defined period
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afterwards.
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) use a ten-variable VAR at a quarterly frequency and
the same definition for the two fiscal variables as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They
impose that a business cycle shock jointly moves output, consumption, non-residential
investment and government revenue in the same direction for four quarters following
the shock. In other words, when output and government revenues move in the same
direction, the assumption is that this must be due to some improvement in the business
cycle, generating the increase in revenues, and not the other way around. On the other
hand fiscal policy shocks are identified only through restricting the impulse responses of
the fiscal variables.
One of the main results obtained via the sign-restriction approach is that a surprise
deficit-financed tax cut is the best fiscal policy to stimulate the economy. Deficit spend-
ing weakly stimulates the economy, it crowds out private investment without causing
interest rates to rise, and it does not cause a rise in real wages. As in Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), investment falls in response to both tax increases and government spend-
ing increases. In contrast to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), consumption does not rise
strongly; in fact the response of consumption is small and significant only on impact.
This is more in line with Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). Finally, real wages do
not rise in response to an increase in government spending and have a negative response
on impact and at longer horizons. Hence, the responses of investment, consumption and
real wages to a government spending shock are difficult to reconcile with the standard
Keynesian approach, although they are not the responses predicted by the benchmark
real business cycle model either.
1.6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the theoretical and empirical literature that studies the effects of fiscal
policy on the macroeconomy. While consensus has emerged on the positive effect that
an expansionary fiscal policy has on output and hours worked, no widespread consensus
exists on the effects that such a policy delivers to private consumption, real wages and
investment.
On one hand, in standard RBC models the negative wealth effect on households’
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lifetime resource constraint prevails, leading to a decrease in private consumption and
wages, and an increase in hours worked and investment. On the other hand, in more
or less articulated new-Keynesian models a crowding-in effect of consumption and an
increase in wages is made possible also under plausible calibrations.
While early empirical contributions gave credit to the standard neoclassical predic-
tions, the most recent econometric applications, generally making use of structural VARs,
have supported and in many cases have inspired the latest new-Keynesian claims.
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Source: Our DYNARE computations based on Baxter and King (1993).
Figure 1.1: A permanent increase in government purchases financed by lump-sum taxes.
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Source: Our DYNARE computations based on Baxter and King (1993).
Figure 1.2: A temporary increase in government purchases financed by lump-sum taxes.
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Source: Our DYNARE computations based on Baxter and King (1993).
Figure 1.3: A temporary increase in government purchases financed by distortionary
taxes.
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Source: Our DYNARE computations based on Baxter and King (1993).
Figure 1.4: A permanent increase in public investment financed by lump-sum taxes.
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Source: Our DYNARE computations based on Gaĺı, López-Salido, and Valles (2007).
Figure 1.5: A positive shock in government purchases in a New-Keynesian framework.
47
Chapter 2
The Effects of Fiscal Shocks in
SVAR Models: A Graphical
Modelling Approach 1
2.1 Introduction
In macroeconomics there is still no widespread consensus on the impact and transmis-
sion channels of fiscal policy on many variables. Both theoretical and empirical studies
generally find a positive response of output and hours worked to a positive shock to gov-
ernment purchases and the disagreement is usually about the magnitude and timing of
the response. On the contrary, the sign of the responses of variables such as consumption,
wages and investment is still a matter of debate.
In the theoretical literature, on one hand neoclassical Real Business Cycle (RBC)
theory claims that a positive government spending shock triggers a negative wealth ef-
fect that dampens consumption, fosters labour supply and curbs real wages (e.g. Baxter
and King (1993)). On the other hand, Keynesian theories and recent dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models such as Linnemann (2006), Ravn et al. (2006) and
Gali et al. (2007) among others, assert that an expansionary fiscal policy boosts con-
1This chapter draws on Fragetta, M. and Melina, G. (2010) The Effects of Fiscal Shocks in SVAR
Models: A Graphical Modelling Approach, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance, 1006.
Comments and suggestions by Yunus Aksoy, Sergio Destefanis, John Driffill, Marco Reale, Lucio Sarno,
Ron Smith, Granville Wilson and seminar participants at Birkbeck College and Salerno University are
gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
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sumption, hours worked and real wages. In addition, while RBC theories predict that
real output should rise less than proportionally to the increase in government spend-
ing, due to the crowding-out effect on consumption, Keynesian theories foresee that the
increase in consumption should amplify the expansionary effect on output.
The empirical literature of the late 1990s, such as Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and
Edelberg et al. (1999), mostly relying on vector-autoregressions (VAR) employing a nar-
rative approach to identify discretionary fiscal policy shocks, supports RBC predictions.
More recent empirical studies, starting from Blanchard and Perotti (2002), adopt struc-
tural VARs (SVAR) for the purpose of identification and obtain results more in line with
Keynesian claims.
Indeed, VAR analysis is a standard tool to understand what happens in actual
economies and to evaluate competing theoretical economic models. SVARs, however,
generally require the imposition of a number of restrictions, which is often a complex
and contentious task, as they may be based on possibly arguable assumptions.
In this chapter we conduct a SVAR analysis for the US economy that combines
Graphical Modelling (GM) theory. Such an approach allows us to obtain identifying
restrictions from statistical properties of the data. The starting point is the computation
of partial correlations among the variables in the model and the subsequent construction
of a Conditional Independence Graph (CIG), a graphical representation of all statistically
significant interconnections among all variables. From the CIG, based on well defined
statistical rules, we derive Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), graphical representations
of the many possible structural VARs, which are later evaluated by means of statistical
information criteria.
Our results are generally in line with the recent SVAR literature (Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005), Caldara and Kamps (2008) among others) and hence give
credit to Keynesian claims. In response to a positive government spending shock, we
detect a partially deficit-financed fiscal policy and obtain a fiscal multiplier of output
greater than one. Adding more recent data increases the magnitude of the fiscal multi-
plier compared to earlier studies such as Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Private consump-
tion shows a positive and persistent response to a spending shock. While non-residential
investment is significantly crowded out by the fiscal expansion, residential investment
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rises, comoving with output. However, the crowding-out effect on non-residential invest-
ment is not stable over the sample considered. Lastly, a positive response of real wages
coexists with an increase in hours worked. As far as the effects of a positive tax shock
are concerned, we find that peak responses of consumption, non-residential investment
and the initial response of hours worked show signs consistent with a negative wealth
effect. Subsample checks confirm that results are stable over the sample.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an
overview of recent theoretical and empirical contributions in the field of the macroe-
conomic implications of fiscal policy. Section 2.3 illustrates the principles of graphical
modelling and how it can be used to identify SVARs. Section 2.4 presents the data.
Section 2.5 identifies a number of SVARs to evaluate the effects of fiscal policy shocks on
the US economy. Section 6 describes the econometric results and conduct some stability
checks. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
Following a positive shock to government spending, textbook IS-LM theory predicts
that consumption should rise and thus amplify the expansionary effects of spending on
output. In constrast, as shown by Baxter and King (1993), neoclassical Real Business
Cycle (RBC) theory generally predicts a positive response of investment and a negative
response of consumption and wages. As Gaĺı, López-Salido, and Valles (2007) point out,
this substantial difference across the two classes of models lays on the more or less implicit
assumption made on the behaviour of consumers: in the IS-LM model, consumption only
depends on current disposable income, hence consumers are all non-Ricardian; in the
RBC model consumption depends on life-time wealth, hence consumers are all optimising
Ricardian agents. In the RBC model, an increase in government purchases, through an
increase in current and/or future taxes, triggers a negative wealth effect that decreases
consumption, increases labour supply and decreases wages. The increase in the marginal
product of capital, allowed by the increase in labour, causes also a positive reaction of
investment.
The early empirical literature, mainly using vector-autoregressions (VAR), supports
the RBC claims. In general, empirical studies aiming at studying the effects of fiscal
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policy shocks confront great difficulties in identifying such shocks, as they have to disen-
tangle the role of automatic stabilisers responding to business cycles from the effects of
discretionary fiscal policies. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) introduce the dummy-variable
or narrative approach, due to Hamilton (1985), in the context of fiscal policy, though in
a univariate setting. The methodology consists in constructing a dummy variable that
takes value one at quarters when large military build-ups took place in the US, in order
to identify episodes of discretionary fiscal policy. Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher
(1999) extend this methodology to a multivariate context, and Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Fisher (2000),2 as well as Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) make some modifications.
Despite slight methodological differences, all these studies generally reach the same con-
clusions, at least from a qualitative point of view: in response to a discretionary sub-
stantial positive government spending shock, output increases, consumption and wages
decline, non-residential investment rises, while residential investment falls. Therefore,
these findings support the neoclassical business cycle literature.
More recent empirical studies aiming at detecting the effects of government spend-
ing shocks make use of structural vector-autoregressions in order to trace the impulse
responses of the macroeconomic variables of interest. Fats and Mihov (2001) find that
there is a strong, positive and persistent impact of fiscal expansions on economic activity.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) achieve identification by relying on institutional informa-
tion about the tax collection, constructing the automatic response of fiscal variables to
the business cycle and, by implication, identifying discretionary fiscal policy shocks. The
Blanchard-Perotti approach yields a positive effect of a government spending shock on
output and consumption and a negative effect on investment. While these findings are
perfectly reasonable in a Keynesian world, they are difficult to reconcile with the RBC
literature. Perotti (2005) extends the structural VAR methodology to other countries
and reaches similar conclusions. Moreover, Perotti (2007) proposes a variant of the nar-
rative approach that allows the responses to each Ramey-Shapiro episode to have both
a different intensity and a different shape. In addition, the author introduces a different
2Within the field of RBC models, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), in addition to their econo-
metric analysis, also build a variant of the neoclassical growth model distinguishing between residential
and non-residential investment to match their empirical findings. Instead, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Fisher (2000) introduce habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment to better
mimic the timing and quantitative responses of hours worked, investment and consumption.
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method to build the dummy variable, which allows to isolate the abnormal fiscal events
and to estimate the normal dynamic response of the non-fiscal variables to these events.
Using this methodology the response of consumption is positive, in line with the struc-
tural VAR approach. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) extends Uhlig (2005)’s sign-restriction
approach to fiscal policy and find a negative response of investment to a fiscal expansion.
However, they find a small response of consumption, significant only on impact.
In order to match the most recent empirical findings, the theoretical literature has
recently worked on models able to explain the positive response of consumption to a
fiscal expansion. Linneman (2006) uses a non-additively separable utility function within
a neoclassical growth model that is able to mimic a pattern for consumption similar to
the one found by the structural VAR literature. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006)
assume habit persistence on the consumption of individual differentiated goods, which
implies a countercyclical mark-up of price over the marginal cost. A government spending
shock has a negative wealth effect, yet it also boosts aggregate demand, firms reduce
their mark-up, labour demand increases and offsets the negative income effect affecting
labour supply. As a result, wages and consumption rise. Gaĺı, López-Salido, and Valles
(2007) cast fiscal policy into a new-Keynesian sticky-price model modified to allow for the
presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Non-Ricardian households are key for the purposes
of the model, as they partly insulate aggregate demand from the negative wealth effects
generated by the higher levels of current and future taxes needed to finance the fiscal
expansion. In this model, the magnitudes of the responses of output and consumption
are systematically greater than those generated by the neoclassical model. In addition,
the increase in aggregate hours coexists with an increase in real wages. This response of
wages is made possible by sticky prices. In fact, even in the face of a drop in the marginal
product of labour, real wages can increase as the price mark-up may adjust sufficiently
downward to absorb the resulting gap. The combined effect of higher real wages and
higher employment raises labour income and stimulates consumption of rule-of-thumb
households, and the overall effect on consumption is positive.
Table 2.1 summarises the results of the theoretical and empirical literature surveyed.
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2.3 Econometric methodology
This section outlines the econometric methodology that we employ to analyze the ef-
fects of fiscal policy shocks. Subsection 2.3.1 explains the basic principles of graphical
modelling. Subsection 2.3.2 illustrates how graphical modelling can be used to identify
structural shocks in a VAR framework.
2.3.1 Graphical modelling
Graphical modelling is a statistical approach aiming at uncovering statistical causal-
ity from partial correlations observed in the data, which can be interpreted as linear
predictability in the case of a linear regression model.3 Primal contributions to the
methodology are due to Dempster (1972) and Darroch, Lauritzen, and Speed (1980).
The initial step of the procedure is to compute partial correlations between variables,
the significance of which can be tested by using appropriate statistics. Statistically sig-
nificant partial correlations can be then represented by an undirected graph called Con-
ditional Independence Graph (CIG), where random variables are represented by nodes
and a significant partial correlation between any two random variables – conditioned on
all the remaining variables of the model – represented by a line known as undirected edge.
In Figure 2.1.A, we show an example of a CIG. For instance, the edge connecting nodes
A and B represents a significant partial correlation between A and B conditioned on
C. A significant partial correlation implies conditional dependence if the variables are
jointly distributed as a multivariate Gaussian distribution, hence the name Conditional
Independence Graph.
When an arrow links the nodes of a CIG, we obtain what is called Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG). DAGs and CIGs imply a different definition of joint probability. For
example, if we consider Figure 2.1.A, we can assert that A and C are independent,
conditional on C. Therefore, the joint distribution implied by the CIG is the following:
fA,C|B = fA|BfC|B
while a corresponding DAG such as the one in Figure 2.1.C2 has a joint distribution
3In this context least squares and maximum likelihood estimation are equivalent.
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equal to:
fA,B,C = fC|BfB|AfA.
Nevertheless, there is a correspondence between the two, represented by the so-called
moralization rule, as firstly shown by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988). In fact, there
is always a unique CIG deriving from a given DAG, obtained by transforming arrows
into undirected edges and linking unlinked parents of a common child with a moral edge.
In the DAG shown in Figure 2.1.B1, A and C are parents of B. In order to obtain
the corresponding unique CIG we must transform arrows into edges and add a moral
edge between parents A and C as in Figure 2.1.B2. Statistically, when both A and C
determine B, a significant partial correlation due to moralization should be observed
between A and C.4
While there is a unique CIG deriving from a given DAG, the reverse is not true.
What we can observe in the data is a CIG, where every edge can assume two possible
directions. Therefore, for any given CIG, there are 2n hypothetical DAGs, where n is
the number of edges. Figure 2.1.C shows all the hypothetical DAGs corresponding to
the CIG in Figure 2.1.A. According to what we have said above, the DAG in Figure
2.1.C1 is not compatible with the CIG, because the moralization rule requires a moral
edge between A and C, which is not captured by the CIG.
In the process of obtaining plausible DAGs from an observed CIG, it might also be
possible that some of the links captured by the CIG are due to moralization and hence
must be eliminated in a corresponding DAG. Such demoralization process, in most cases,
can be assessed by considering some quantitative rules. Let us suppose we observe a
CIG such as the one in Figure 2.1.B2. If the true corresponding DAG were the one in
Figure 2.1.B1, then the partial correlation between A and C, ρA,C|B, should be equal to
−ρA,B|C × ρB,C|A. In such a case, when tracing DAG 1.B1, the edge between A and C
must be removed.
Any DAG, by definition, has to satisfy the principle of acyclicality. Therefore, the
4An example should provide a more intuitive insight into the moralization rule: if one wants to become
a famous football player (P ), he/she must have good skills (S) and/or must work hard (W ). Therefore
S and W are determinants of P . Conditional on P , there may be cases where S is high and W is low;
cases where W is high and S is low; and cases where both S and W are high. There cannot be cases
where S and W are both low, otherwise we would not observe P . This example shows that S and W are
(negatively) correlated given P .
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graph depicted in Figure 2.2 cannot be a DAG as it is clearly cyclic. The acyclicality in
a DAG allows to completely determine the distribution of a set of variables and implies
a recursive ordering of the variables, where each element in turn depends on none, one
or more elements. For example, in the DAG in Figure 2.1.C2, A depends on no other
variables, B depends on A and C on B.
2.3.2 Graphical modelling in the identification of a SVAR
Graphical Modelling (GM) theory can be applied to obtain identification of structural
VARs (SVAR), as shown by Reale and Wilson (2001) and Oxley, Wilson, and Reale
(2009) among others. This literature considers GM as a data-driven approach that
represents a possible solution to the problem of imposing restrictions to identify a SVAR.
Any SVAR may be turned into a DAG where current and lagged variables are rep-
resented by nodes and causal dependence by arrows. To do so, we need to establish
pairwise relationships among contemporaneous variables in terms of partial correlations
conditioned on all the remaining contemporaneous and lagged values. In many cases,
it is possible to obtain more parsimonious models since some lagged variables do not
play any significant role in explaining contemporaneous variables and the correspond-
ing coefficient vectors present some zeros.5 In this chapter, however, we will consider
SVARs where the data generating process presents all the lagged values, as it is standard
practice in the applied econometric literature aiming at analyzing the impulse responses
of a set of macroeconomic variables. The first step in constructing a DAG representa-
tion of a SVAR is the determination of the lag order through the minimization of an
order selection criterion such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Hannan
and Quinn Information Criterion (HIC) or the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC).
We can then derive a pth-order vector autoregressive model, m-dimensional time series
Xt = (xt,1, xt,2, ..., xt,m) in canonical (or reduced) form, which can be expressed as:
Xt = c+A1Xt−1 +A2Xt−2 + ...+ApXt−p + ut
where c allows for a non-zero mean of Xt, each variable is expressed as a linear function of
5Reale and Tunnicliffe (2001) and Oxley et al. (2009) argue that, in some cases, a sparse lag structure
may yield models with better statistical properties.
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its own past values, the past values of all other variables being considered and a serially
uncorrelated innovation ut, whose covariance matrix V is generally not diagonal. The
correlation between two errors represents the partial correlation of two contemporaneous
variables conditioned on all the lagged values. Hence, in order to construct the CIG
among contemporaneous variables conditioned on all the remaining contemporaneous
and lagged variables, we can derive the sample partial correlation between the innova-
tions, conditioned on the remaining innovations of the canonical VAR,6 calculated from
the inverse Ŵ of the sample covariance matrix V̂ of the whole set of innovations as:
ρ̂(ui,t, uj,t|{uk,t}) = −Ŵij/
√
(ŴiiŴjj)
where {uk,t} is the whole set of innovations excluding the two considered.
The critical value utilised to test for the significance of the sample partial correlations
can be calculated by using the relationship between a regression t-value and the sample
partial correlation, as shown by Greene (2003), and considering the asymptotic normal





where n is the sample size, ν = n−k−1 are the residual degrees of freedom obtained as a
regression of one variable on all the remaining variables and z represents a critical value
at a chosen significance level of the standard normal distribution. Whenever a sample
partial correlation is greater than the calculated critical value, a link is retained.
All arrows end in nodes representing contemporaneous variables. At this point, the
only causality we can assume is the relationship between lagged and contemporaneous
variables determined by the flow of time. Next, we need to consider all the possible DAGs
representing alternative competitive models of the relationships among contemporaneous
variables. Finally, we compare the DAGs compatible with the estimated CIG by using
likelihood based methods,7 such as AIC, HIC and SIC, and choose the best-performing
6Granger and Swanson (1997) have applied a similar strategy to sort out causal flows among con-
temporaneous variables, i.e. applying a residual orthogonalization of the innovations from a canonical
VAR.
7In some cases, the distributional properties of the variables for different DAGs are likelihood equiv-
alent, although the residual series are different. In such cases, it is possible to construct DAG models by
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DAG.8
In order to construct an empirically well-founded SVAR, we have to assure that
the covariance matrix of the resulting residuals is diagonal. A first diagnostic check
is thus inspecting the significance of such correlations. Further diagnostic checks are
possible. For instance, as this procedure typically imposes over-identifying restrictions,
a χ2 likelihood-ratio test can be conducted.
2.4 Data
In order to make our results comparable with the previous literature, we use the same
sample period and data sources as Caldara and Kamps (2008). Therefore, we use quar-
terly US data over the period 1955:1-2006:4. All series are seasonally adjusted by the
source.
Our baseline model is a three-variable VAR that includes the log of real per capita
government spending (gt), the log of real per capita net taxes (tt) and the log of real per
capita GDP (yt). Government spending and taxes are net of social transfers. Government
spending is the sum of government consumption and investment, while net taxes are
obtained as government current receipts less current transfers and interest payments.9
To assess the effects of fiscal policy shocks on a set of key macroeconomic variables, we
follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and specify four-variable VAR models by adding
one variable at a time to the baseline model. The other variables are the log of real per
capita private consumption (ct), the log of per capita hours worked (ht), the log of the
real wage (wt), the log of real per capita private residential investment (R), and the log
of real per capita private non-residential investment (NR).
We extracted the components of GDP, government receipts, and the GDP deflator
from the NIPA tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We obtained real hourly
compensation from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the measure of per capita hours
considering only the lagged variables that play a significant role in explaining contemporaneous variables
determined by the significant partial correlation. This can help, via comparison of information criteria,
determine the best DAG for contemporaneous variables.
8Even in the presence of non-stationary variables, the sampling properties of GM and the outlined
procedure are still valid, as shown by Wilson and Reale (2008).
9We converted the components of national income and net taxes into real per-capita terms by dividing
their nominal values by the GDP deflator and the civilian population. The latter is available in the
ALFRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.
2.5 Identification of structural vector-autoregressions 58
worked used in Francis and Ramey (2005) from Ramey’s webpage.
2.5 Identification of structural vector-autoregressions
We study the effects of fiscal policy shocks from a macroeconomic perspective by means
of structural VAR models identified through DAGs.
After collecting the endogenous variables of interest in the k-dimensional vector Xt,
the reduced-form VAR model associated to it can be written as:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + ut (2.1)
where A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L and ut is a k-dimensional vector of
reduced-form disturbances with E[ut] = 0 and E[utu′t] = Σu.
10
As the reduced-form disturbances are correlated, in order to identify fiscal policy
shocks, we need to transform the reduced-form models into structural models. Pre-
multiplying both sides of equation (2.1) by the (k × k) matrix A0, yields the structural
form:
A0Xt = A0A(L)Xt−1 +Bet (2.2)
In our benchmark case we also include a constant and a linear trend among regressors.
The relationship between the structural disturbances et and the reduced-form distur-
bances ut is described by the following:
A0ut = Bet (2.3)
where A0 also describes the contemporaneous relation among the endogenous variables
and B is a (k × k) matrix. In the structural model, disturbances are assumed to be
uncorrelated with each other. In other words, the covariance matrix of the structural
disturbances Σe is diagonal.
As it is, the model described by equation 2.2 is not identified. Therefore, first we
restrict matrix B to be a (k × k) diagonal matrix. As a result, the diagonal elements
10We report results obtained by using a 4-th order lag polynomial for all models, as it is the usual
choice with quartely data and is in line with the related literature. However, using the number of lags
suggested by information criteria yields no differences, as we obtain CIGs with the same edges.
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of B will represent estimated standard deviations of the structural shocks. In order to
impose identifying restrictions on matrix A0, we apply graphical modeling theory and
trace DAGs of the reduced-form residuals.
A feature of DAGs is acyclicality, which implies a recursive ordering of the variables
that makes A0 a lower-triangular matrix. A0 has generally zero elements also in its lower
triangular part, hence, in general, the model is over-identified. The GM methodology
has the distinctive feature that the variable ordering and any further restrictions come
from statistical properties of the data.
Consistently with the methodology described in Section 2.3, we build DAGs of the
residuals obtained by fitting the various specifications to equation (2.1). In Table 2.2
we report the estimated partial correlation matrices of the series innovations and their
significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels. These allows us to draw the CIGs reported
in the left column of Figure 2.3. The statistical strength of the links is represented by
dashed, thin or thick lines, which reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels,
respectively.
Applying the GM procedure allows us to define the DAGs reported in the right
column of Figure 2.3.
DAG a2- baseline. The two edges in CIG a1 cannot be moral, as moral edges link
parents of a common child. The four possible DAGs implied by CIG a1 are reported in
Figure 2.4. DAG (B) can be discarded because a moral edge between ugt and u
t
t is not
captured in the CIG. Hence, we need to compare the three remaining models. Table 2.3
shows that the three information criteria reported are minimised by the model implied
by DAG (A). The best performing DAG implies that government spending is not affected
contemporaneously by shocks originating in the private sector. As we employ quarterly
data and definitions of fiscal variables that exclude most of the automatic stabilizers,
this finding makes economic sense in the light of the typical decision and implementation
lags present in the budgeting process. Such an argument is shared by virtually all other
related empirical studies. However, while the related literature uses this argument as an
a-priori identifying assumption,11 in this chapter we obtain it as a result. If we fit DAG
11First, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that in contrast to monetary policy, decision and im-
plementation lags in fiscal policy imply that, within a quarter, there is little discretionary response of
fiscal policy to unexpected contemporaneous movements in activity. Next, Caldara and Kamps (2008),
when they apply a recursive approach à la Choleski, order government spending first. Last, Mountford
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(A) to the estimated residuals, we get significant coefficients (t-statistics are reported
adjacent to directed edges) and signs compatible with economic arguments. An increase
in government spending has a contemporaneous (within a quarter) effect on real output,
the tax base increases and, thus, tax receipts contemporaneously rise. As a diagnostic
check, we inspect the cross-correlations matrix of the resulting residuals in Table 2.4
and find that all cross-correlations lie within two standard errors from zero. We use the
directions obtained for the baseline variables also in the DAGs that follow.
DAG b2- consumption. Same arguments apply to baseline variables. In addition,





not appear in CIG b1. Fitting this DAG yields significant coefficients and signs are
compatible with economic arguments. In particular, a positive shock to income has a
contemporaneous positive effect on consumption. All cross-correlations of the resulting
residuals are insignificant.
DAG c2- hours worked. Our best DAG selected on the basis of the information criteria
(not reported) indicates a strongly significant coefficient for the contemporaneous output
in the hours equation. Moreover an increase in contemporaneous hours worked has a
contemporaneous positive effect on tax receipts. The resulting cross correlation between
the residual series are all not statistically different from zero.
DAG d2- real wage. The link between ugt and u
w
t , significant at a 0.10 level, may
be a moral link in the case in which uwt → u
y
t . However, information criteria suggest
that uyt → uwt . The positive coefficient of u
y
t in the regression of u
w
t captures a positive
contemporaneous effect on real wages of a shock to economic activity.
DAG e2- residential investment. We apply analogous arguments to those applied to





which does not appear in CIG e1. Fitting this DAG yields significant coefficients and
signs are compatible with economic arguments. In particular, a boom in economic activ-
ity has a contemporaneous positive effect on residential investment. All cross-correlations
of the resulting residuals are insignificant.
DAG f2- non-residential investment. The CIG for non residential investment is the
and Uhlig (2008), when using the sign-restriction approach, define a business cycle shock as a shock
which jointly moves output, consumption, non-residential investment and government revenue, but not
government spending.
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one with the richest set of contemporaneous relationships among variables. In addition
to the relationships already established for the baseline variables, government spending
has a contemporaneous (negative) effect on non-residential investment. Therefore we
need to establish the relationship between taxes and non residential investment and
between output and non residential investment. This makes 22 = 4 potential DAGs. The
information criteria select the model in which output has a contemporaneous positive
effect on non-residential investment and the latter has a contemporaneous positive effect
on tax receipts. The resulting cross correlations between the residuals do not differ
statistically from zero.
Now, we can use the DAGs depicted in Figure 2.3 to impose restrictions on matrix
A0. This allows us to identify our structural VAR models. For illustrative purposes we
show what the relationship between the structural disturbances et and the reduced-form
disturbances ut looks like in the model for private consumption:

1 0 0 0
−a21 1 0 0
0 −a32 1 0














b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0













In the appendix, we report matrices for all models.
As anticipated above, matrix A0 is over-identified, as the assumption of orthonormal
structural innovations imposes k(k+1)/2 restrictions on the k2 unknown elements of A0,
where k is the number of endogenous variables. In the case of four variables, this makes
six restrictions. It follows that we have three over-identifying restrictions.
In Table 2.5, for all models we report the variable ordering in vectorXt, the maximum-
likelihood estimates of matrices A0 and B, and the likelihood-ratio (LR) test for over-
identification. All estimated coefficients have the right signs and are significant at least
at a 0.05 level. Moreover, we fail to reject LR-tests for over-identification of all models
at any reasonable level of significance.
All the estimated SVAR models identify identical structural fiscal policy shocks. This
is clearly depicted in Figure 2.5, where the identified spending and tax shock deriving
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from the six models above are coincident series.
2.6 Results
In this section we present empirical results for government spending and tax shocks by
analyzing the impulse responses obtained from the SVARs identified above.
Following the procedure by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we transform the impulse
responses of output and its components in such a way that they can be interpreted as
multipliers. In other words, they represent the dollar response of the respective variable
when the economy is hit by a fiscal shock of size one dollar. To achieve this, first, we
divide the original impulse responses by the standard deviation of the respective fiscal
shock. This allows us to deal with shocks of size one percent. Second, we multiply the
resulting responses by the ratio of the responding variable to the shocked fiscal variable,
evaluated at the sample mean.
As far as the impulse responses of hours worked and wages are concerned, we simply
express them as percentage-point changes subsequent to a fiscal shock of size one percent.
For each variable we report responses for a 40-quarter horizon and 90 percent confidence
intervals obtained by applying the procedure due to Hall (1992) with 2000 boostrap
replications.
2.6.1 Government spending shock
In Figure 2.6 we report results for a government spending shock of one dollar.
Government spending reacts strongly and persistently to its own shock. It reaches
its peak of 1.15 dollars after one year and persistently stays above baseline (more 95
percent of the shock is still present after two years).
Real output increases on impact by almost 1.10 dollars, slightly decreases after two
quarters, and then rises again up to a peak of 1.75 dollars two years after the shock.
Then, it persistently and significantly stays above baseline. The spending multiplier is
greater than one both on impact and at a longer time horizon.
Taxes partly offset the one-dollar increase in government spending, since they rise
up to 30 cents, probably as an automatic response to the increase in output (note that
the shape of the tax response mimic that of output). Taxes reach their peak of more
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than 50 cents four quarters after the shock. This suggests that the fiscal expansion is at
least partially deficit-financed. The response of taxes is also long lasting and statistically
significant on impact, after a year, and at longer horizons.
Private consumption shows a positive, smooth and hump-shaped response to the
government spending shock. It increases on impact by 35 cents to reach a peak of almost
90 cents ten quarters after the shock has occurred. Then, it persistently stays above
baseline.
Private non-residential investment does not move on impact, but declines afterwards
showing a peak crowding-out effect of almost -75 cents one year after the spending shock.
Residential investment reacts positively on impact to the fiscal expansion, probably
following the increase in output, rising by almost 10 cents and reaching a peak of 20
cents after one year.
Hours worked react positively to a fiscal expansion of one percent from baseline,
rising by 0.10 percent on impact and by 0.14 percent after three quarters. Even if the
response of hours is not statistically significant at all quarters, significance is achieved
at the mentioned quarters and at a longer horizon.
The response of real wages is slightly negative on impact, as they fall by 0.06 percent.
They turn positive after a quarter reaching a peak of 0.20 percent after two years and
persistently stay above baseline.
2.6.2 Tax shock
In Figure 2.7 we report results for a tax shock of size one dollar.
The tax response reaches its peak on impact and then declines quite smoothly till dy-
ing out. The policy experiment shows that a tax increase does not yield any statistically
significant effect on output, residential investment, and real wages. Instead, the peak
responses of consumption, non-residential investment and hours worked are statistically
significant. While consumption decreases by 10 cents two quarters after the shock, non-
residential investment rises up to 7 cents three quarters ahead. Last, hours worked reach
their peak at 3 percent, three quarters after the tax shock.
As far as the tax policy shock is concerned, from a statistical point of view, we are able
to comment only on the peak responses of the mentioned variables. Nevertheless, from
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an economic point of view, these results are sufficient to detect that a negative wealth
effect affects the US economy when the latter is hit by a positive tax shock. In fact, as
a consequence of a negative wealth effect we would expect consumption and leisure to
decline, i.e. hours worked to rise and private non-residential investment to increase, given
the increase in the marginal product of capital determined by the increase in employment.
The signs of the peak responses of consumption, non-residential investment and hours
worked are consistent with this transmission mechanism.
2.6.3 Subsample stability
We first employ forecast Chow tests to check the overall stability of the parameters of
the estimated models. Once the sample has been split into two parts, this test allows
us to detect whether a structural change has occurred, by comparing the full sample
residual variance with the residual variance of the whole sample. In other words, the
test checks whether forecasts made exploiting the first subsample are compatible with the
observations contained in the second subsample. We start from 1961:3 and recursively
repeat the test at each subsequent data point. Given the tendency of the test to over-
reject the null, i.e. to yield a high type I error (Lütkephol, 2005), we recover p-values
with a procedure based on 2000 bootstrap replications. As we observe in Figure 2.8, the
test fails to reject the null of parameter constancy on every occasion at any reasonable
significance level.
Then we replicate SVAR estimation and impulse response analysis by removing ten
years of observations at a time.
In Figure 2.9, we report responses to a government spending shock. For all responding
variables but non-residential investment, subsample variability does not produce changes
in the impulse responses able to controvert the main findings outlined above.
Figure 2.10 depicts responses to a tax shock. Except for the responses of government
spending and real wages, also in this case, removing a decade of observations at a time
does not yield very different responses compared to the ones obtained by exploiting the
full sample.
In Table 2.6, we report peak responses and their significance. As far as the gov-
ernment spending shock is concerned, the peak responses of all variables except non-
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residential investment, systematically show the same sign across subsample even if their
magnitude varies over time.12 In particular, removing the last ten years in the sample
decreases the fiscal multiplier.
Signs of the peak responses obtained by exerting a positive tax shock are stable
for tax revenue itself, consumption, residential and non-residential investment. Hours
worked show negative, though insignificant, peak responses. However, for at least two
quarters after the shock, responses are positive and statistically significant.
2.6.4 Relation with other studies
As discussed in Section 2.2, the recent DSGE literature regards as a stylized fact that
private consumption increases when the economy is hit by an expansionary fiscal spending
shock. Our empirical results for the US economy, relying on an alternative identification
approach to those commonly employed in the related literature, support this claim.
With respect to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the fiscal multiplier on output is
greater: 1.75 against 1.29. This difference depends on the inclusion of more recent data.
In fact, when we remove data from 1995:1 to 2006:4, the peak multiplier declines to 1.31.
Consistently with new-generation DSGE models, we also find that while non-residential
investment falls, hours worked and real wages rise as a consequence of a positive gov-
ernment spending shock. As in Caldara and Kamps (2008), our results also show quite
persistent impulse responses for consumption and real wages. This is not the case in
theoretical models such as Gali et al. (2007) where the responses of consumption and
wages are initially positive but they turn negative after one year.
As far as the tax shock is concerned, in principle one may argue that real output does
not respond on impact to tax shocks because the graphical modelling approach imposes
a unique contemporaneous relation from output to taxes, when the contemporaneous
effect of taxes on output may be conceptually important. Caldara and Kamps (2008) in
applying the Blanchard-Perotti methodology to their data find that the impact response
of output to taxes does not significantly differ from zero, which is also captured by our
DAGs. Moreover this result is in line with the results reported by Perotti (2005).
12Unlike in the full sample, taxes and hours worked show negative peak responses when the decade
1965:1-1974:4 is removed but these are not statistically significant.
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2.7 Concluding remarks
We have applied graphical modelling theory to identify fiscal policy shocks in SVAR
models of the US economy. This approach has allowed us to rely on statistical properties
of the data for the purpose of identification.
In response to a positive government spending shock we obtain results in line with
Keynesian views. First, real output responds positively and more than proportionally.
Next, private consumption shows a positive and persistent response to a spending shock.
While non-residential investment is significantly crowded out by the fiscal expansion,
residential investment rises, comoving with output. Last, a positive response of real
wages coexists with an increase in hours worked.
When we analyse the effects of a positive tax shock, in general, we do not obtain
statistically significant impulse responses. However, peak responses of consumption and
non-residential investment, as well as the initial response of hours worked are statistically
significant and their signs are consistent with a negative wealth effect incepted by the
increase in taxation.
The outlined results are stable over the sample period. In general, adding more recent
data increases the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier compared to earlier studies. The
crowding-out effect on non-residential investment is not systematically captured in all
subsamples.
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Non-residential investment:
1 0 0 0
−a21 1 0 0
−a31 −a32 1 0
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Model AIC HIC SIC
A 506.00 530.16 565.73
C 507.04 531.20 566.76
D 571.64 551.80 587.37























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2: Directed cyclic graph.
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Note: In the CIGs (left column), the strengths of the links are indicated by significance at the 0.10 level (dashed
line), 0.05 level (thin line), 0.01 level (bold line). In the DAGs (right column), t-statistics of the estimated
regression coefficients are shown adjacent to the directed links.
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(b) Tax shocks.
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(h) Real wages
Note: Dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals computed according to Hall’s (1992) algorithm with 2000 bootstrap repli-
cations. Responses are shown for a 40-quarter horizon. The impulse responses of government spending, taxes and real output
are computed on the basis of the baseline 3-variable SVAR. The impulse responses of the remaining variables are obtained from
4-variable models obtained by adding one variable at a time to the baseline model. Impulse response of real output and its compo-
nents are rescaled to represent the dollar change of the variables to a shock to government spending of size one dollar. The impulse
responses of hours worked and real wages are rescaled to represent the percentage change subsequent to a government spending
shock of size one percent.
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(h) Real wages
Note: Dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals computed according to Hall’s (1992) algorithm with 2000 bootstrap repli-
cations. Responses are shown for a 40-quarter horizon. The impulse responses of government spending, taxes and real output
are computed on the basis of the baseline 3-variable SVAR. The impulse responses of the remaining variables are obtained from
4-variable models obtained by adding one variable at a time to the baseline model. Impulse response of real output and its com-
ponents are rescaled to represent the dollar change of the variables to a shock to tax revenues of size one dollar. The impulse
responses of hours worked and real wages are rescaled to represent the percentage change subsequent to a tax revenue shock of size
one percent.








































































































Note: Bold horizontal lines represent the 0.05 significance level. Thin horizonal lines represent the 0.10 significance
level. Chow forecast test recursively run at every quarter from 1961:3 to 2006:3. Null hypothesis: parameter
constancy. P-values computed with 2000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 2.10: Subsample stability: tax shock.
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Chapter 3
US Fiscal Indicators, Inflation
and Output 1
3.1 Introduction
Economists often rely on non-structural autoregressive econometric models such as unrestricted
VARs, to explain or to forecast in a parsimonious way variations in key macroeconomic variables
such as inflation and output. While US output variations can be explained somewhat reliably with
the use of a set of relevant variables such as Federal Funds rate and certain monetary aggregates
next to past variations in real output itself, empirical work confronts significant difficulties in
assigning informative variables to explain US inflation movements. Even the Federal Funds rate
fails to provide statistically significant information content to explain inflation variations in a
stable way (see for example Friedman and Kuttner (1992); Stock and Watson (2003)).
Macroeconomic theory is paying increasing attention to the interaction between fiscal and
monetary policymaking in stabilizing inflation, employment and real output. Such an interac-
tion and its consequences for macro-fundamentals are usually studied within theoretical general
equilibrium modelling. However current theoretical models typically focus on aggregate spend-
ing and taxes. We believe that some government expenditure/revenues subcomponents may be
better related with macroeconomic variables due to certain institutional features or preferences
of policymakers. In the literature, there is already evidence that different institutional arrange-
ments across US states yield different macroeconomic outcomes at least as far as business cycle
1This chapter draws on Aksoy, Y. and Melina, G. (2009) US Fiscal Indicators, Inflation and Out-
put, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance, 0918. Comments and suggestions by Sergio
Destefanis, John Driffill, Miguel Leon-Ledesma, Ron Smith, Martin Sola, Peter Tinsley, Stefania Villa,
audiences at the 24th Annual Congress of European Economic Association, the 41st Annual Conference
of the Money Macro and Finance Research Group, and seminar participants at Birkbeck College are
gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
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fluctuations are concerned. For instance, Fats and Mihov (2006) provide a thorough empirical
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of the constraints on fiscal policy and find that states that
face tighter restrictions show less volatile business cycles.
In this chapter, we provide new stylized facts for the US economy that may motivate economic
theory to explore new transmission channels of fiscal policymaking on macroeconomic outcomes.
We take a non-structural, direct, statistical approach as suggested by Friedman and Kuttner
(1992) and Sims (1972, 1980) and perform a systematic analysis on the informational role of
a wide range of fiscal policy indicators to explain US inflation and real output movements.
Reduced form/information value approach, as a preliminary test of statistical connection between
certain variables, is immune to questions of causality, exogeneity or controllability of potential
instruments.
The discretionary motive or the automatic stabilizers’ role in fiscal policymaking is an im-
portant and complex topic, but is not the subject matter of this chapter. For a survey of the
macroeconometric literature on the identification of discretionary fiscal policy see Chapter 1.
By relying on straightforward statistical tests, we find that certain fiscal indicators, contain
additional statistically significant information to explain US inflation and output growth next to
the information contained in the Federal Funds rate and autoregressive components of inflation
and real output. In particular, we find that changes in the federal budget, federal indirect taxes,
as well as state-local expenditures contain valuable lead information for US inflation. Moreover,
state-local budget and state-local indirect taxes are helpful in predicting US real output growth.
Furthermore, informal and formal statistical tests suggest that the information content present
in these variables is stable over time.
To the best of our knowledge, there is neither a theoretical explanation nor other empirical
contribution highlighting the different information content of state-local fiscal variables as op-
posed to the federal counterparts. We suppose that one possible determinant has to do with the
different institutional frameworks of the federal and state-local budgets, which we also document.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the conduct
of US fiscal policy in postwar years and reviews some existing literature on state-local finances.
Section 3.3 presents the dataset used in the chapter. Section 3.4 reports Granger-style regressions
based on inflation and real output equations that include a set of alternative fiscal indicators
together with the Federal Funds rate. Section 3.5 conducts stability tests. Finally, Section 3.6
concludes.
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3.2 Fiscal evolution in the US
Since the 1930s the presence of government in the US economy has steadily increased. Figure
3.1-(a) shows that in postwar times government expenditures have increased from 15 percent
of GDP to reach almost 25 percent in the late 1950s and be around 20 percent in more recent
times. If we add also transfers - which do not enter the definition of GDP - and consider total
government expenditures, which we plot in Figure 3.2-(b), the share is even higher. In 2008 total
expenditures have exceeded 35 percent of GDP.
The increase in government expenditures has been recorded both at the federal and at the
state-local level. Nevertheless, while state-local receipts have always accompanied the pattern of
expenditures, at the federal level expenditures have been higher than revenues for long periods
of time. As Figure 3.1-(c) shows, in the first part of the post-war period, the federal budget
followed a pattern of deficits during wartime and economic crises and surpluses during peacetime
and economic expansion. From 1970 to 1997, the federal deficit was sustained and the budget
never balanced. Only in 1998 the federal budget reported its first surplus since 1969. The budget
was again in deficit in 2004. In 2005, it began to shrink as a consequence of an increase in tax
revenues. Afterwards, a pronounced increase in the federal deficit was recorded.
As Figure 3.1-(c) shows, the sum of state-local budgets behaved in a different way. In
aggregate terms, state-local finances have been close to balanced budget. Indeed, when it comes
to US state budgets, the leitmotif is balanced budget rules. Although across the US there are
disparities in the set of fiscal rules that governs a state’s ability to raise and spend revenue, all
states but Vermont have a more or less stringent fiscal discipline that foresees balanced budgets.
The requirements of the other 49 states can be divided into four groups (Poterba, 1996):
1. In 44 states, the governor must submit a balanced budget, but the state does not have to
enact a budget that matches expenditures and revenues.
2. In 37 states, the legislature must enact a balanced budget, yet actual revenues and expen-
ditures may diverge if there are unexpected fiscal shocks after the budget is adopted.
3. In 6 states, when an unexpected deficit develops during the fiscal year, the governor has
to correct the deficit in the next budget cycle. Because budget cycles in some states are
biennial, this requirement permits substantial periods of budget deficits.
4. In 24 out of the 37 states with balanced budget requirements, the constitution prohibits
the government from carrying deficits into the next budget cycle. This provision represents
the strictest anti-deficit rule, as it requires the legislature either:
i. to cut spending; or
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ii. to raise taxes in the fiscal year when the deficit emerges; or
iii. to float short-term debt to be retired in the next fiscal year.
In 1987, the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) constructed an index
that characterizes fiscal discipline among state governments and ranges from 0 (lax) to 10 (strin-
gent). Only eight states received ACIR scores of 5 or below, whereas 26 received a score of 10
(see Figure 3.2).
Some researchers investigated implications of these institutional arrangements, for key macroe-
conomic variables, particularly for real output, and for macroeconomic policy. Sørensen and
Yosha (2001), for instance, use panel estimation to show that state fiscal policy has a stabilizing
influence on output, but this influence differ across business cycles expansions and downturns.
When state income rises, government revenue initially increases and then reverts to its initial level,
while expenditure remains roughly constant. However, when state income falls, both revenue and
expenditure decline with revenue remaining low for a sustained period. Such asymmetries ap-
pear to be associated with balanced budget rules or political conservatism (that may in turn lead
to constitutional balanced budget rules). More precisely, the tighter the budget rules, the less
effective is fiscal policy at stimulating the economy than it is at slowing it. On the contrary, in
states with relatively less strict budget rules, such as Massachusetts and New York, fiscal policy
appears to mitigate economic slowdowns more than it mutes booms.
Traditionally fiscal policy has received less attention than monetary policy in the macroeco-
nomic literature and, with few exceptions, state fiscal policy has almost been neglected. Among
others, Poterba and Rueben (1999) evaluate the effects of state-level revenue and expenditure
limits on borrowing costs; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (1990) estimate the impact of inflation
on the real expenditures of US state-local government; and Sørensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001)
investigate the cyclical properties of US state-local government finances.
State-local expenditures currently account for 15 percent of US GDP, while federal expendi-
tures have reached more than 20 percent of GDP. Hence both federal and state budgets represent
large shares of the US economy. Moreover, federal and state fiscal policy are intrinsically differ-
ent because institutional and constitutional arrangements foresee a different discipline for their
conduct.
In the remainder of this chapter we distinguish among a large set of aggregate, federal and
state-local fiscal indicators and perform a systematic evaluation of their information-content role
on US output growth and inflation.
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3.3 The data
In the following empirical analysis we use quarterly seasonally-adjusted data covering the period
1955:1-2007:4. We consider US macroeconomic variables, including (i) the real output, repre-
sented by GDP expressed in chained 2000 US dollars; (ii) the price level, represented by the
GDP deflator; (iii) the interest rate, represented by the three-month federal funds rate (middle
rate for each quarter); (iv) thirty-one fiscal indicators belonging to government current receipts
and expenditures at the national, federal and state-local levels; (v) a set of price indices for
government consumption expenditures and gross investment. Most series are extracted from the
database of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Federal funds rates are extracted from
the database of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Table 3.1 reports full descriptions and
sources of all the series.
As the detailed fiscal variables under investigation are provided in nominal terms, we deflate
them using appropriate price indices. Then, we compute percentage changes in the form of
annualized log-differences.2 Only in the cases of government deficits or surpluses we use proper
percentage changes, as they may be negative numbers. We also express the real output growth
and the rate of inflation as annualized log-differences. For the sake of comparability, we also
annualize the interest rate. We report details of all data transformations in Table 3.2.
In Table 3.3, we report the results of unit root tests performed on all the series constructed as
explained above. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root for real output growth and the growth rates of all the fiscal variables.
The level of the interest rate satisfies stationarity properties according to the PP test at a 5
percent significant level and also according to the ADF test at a 10 percent significance level.
The rate of inflation is stationary only according to the PP test. In the remainder of the chapter
we rely on the stationarity of all the aforementioned series.
3.4 Granger non-causality tests
In this section, we investigate the information content of fluctuations of fiscal indicators for output
growth and inflation by means of Granger non-causality tests. By definition of Granger causality
itself (Granger, 1969; Sims, 1972), we are not looking for a proper causality relationship. Instead,
we aim at detecting whether, in the fluctuations of some fiscal indicators, there is exploitable
information that helps predict fluctuations in output and prices, beyond those already predictable
on the basis of fluctuations in output and prices themselves and other promptly observable
variables, such as the interest rate.
2Given a quarterly variable Xt, ∆xt = 400 × (lnXt − lnXt−1).
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Our specifications for real output changes and inflation follow closely Friedman and Kuttner
(1992). However, while they try a number of alternative financial variables and monetary ag-
gregates as a proxy of the monetary policy instrument, we simply use the short-term interest
rate. This choice depends on the fact that we are interested in the information content of fiscal
indicators and not in the comparative performance of alternative financial variables.













γj∆gt−j + νt (3.1)
The terms ∆yt, ∆pt, it, ∆gt, νt represent output growth, inflation, the short term interest rate,
the change in an alternative fiscal indicator and an error term respectively.













γj∆gt−j + νt (3.2)
where all variables are defined as in equation (1).3
In Table 3.4, we report a set of specification tests. With the exception of two cases, the
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test and the White test always reject the null hypothesis of homoskedas-
tic errors. The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange-multiplier test fails to reject the null of uncorrelated
errors. Therefore, throughout the chapter we choose to run all tests based on Wald-type χ-square
statistics computed by taking White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Finally, the
Ramsey RESET test does not unveil further mispecification issues.
We test for Granger non-causality of the fiscal indicators by imposing the null hypothesis
that all the lags of each alternative indicator are jointly insignificant, i.e. HO : γi = 0,∀i =
1, ..., 4. In Table 3.5, we show that fluctuations in government indirect taxes (taxes on production
and import) and in the government surplus/deficit have information content on both output
growth and inflation. At a more disaggregated level, fluctuations in state-local indirect taxes
and deficit contain useful information for output growth (at a 1 percent significance level); for
inflation it is the federal analogues to be informative (at 1 percent and 5 percent significance
levels, respectively). Moreover, contributions for government social insurance at the national and
federal level and the non-defense component of federal expenditures help predict output growth.
Finally, state-local total expenditures, and gross investment help predict inflation at a 10 percent
significance level.
Some previous studies have explored state-local finances and we surveyed them in Section 3.2.
3We also run the tests described below using first differences of the Federal funds rate but differences
in the results are negligible.
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However, to our knowledge, there are no other contributions that find an information-content
role for state-local expenditures on US inflation and state-local revenues or deficits on output
growth.
We also report Granger causality tests run on the Federal funds rate. In all specifications, this
is significant at a 1 percent level in the output growth equation and insignificant in the inflation
equation.4 However, adding more lags of the interest rate (results not reported) helps retrieve
significance also in the inflation equation. Thus, in the cases in which we find an information-
content role for the fiscal variable, the latter does not substitute but adds further information to
that already contained in past values of the interest rate.
In Table 3.6, as a measure of comparative goodness of fit, we report the Akaike information
criteria (AIC) of all the estimated specifications of equations (1) and (2) in ascending order. All
the specifications in which we find information content in the fiscal variable are among the ones
with the lowest AIC (top ten items in Table 3.5). According to AIC, the specifications including
indirect taxes are the ones with the best fit.
3.5 Stability tests
3.5.1 Stability of recursive p-values
To gain initial guidance about the stability of the Granger-causality relationships above, we plot
the recursive p-values of the Wald tests on the joint insignificance of the lags of each alternative
fiscal indicator.
The methodology consists in computing the p-values of the Wald tests above by recursively
changing the sample in the estimation. The resulting plots, using the alternative fiscal indicators,
are depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. From top to bottom we report stability of p-values at: (a) the
national government level; (b) the federal government level; and (c) the state-local government
level.
We obtain recursive p-values in three different ways:
1. by fixing the endpoint (end) of the sample and making the starting point shift quarter by
quarter from an intermediate point in the sample up to the initial observation. The first
p-value reported refers to the sample 1980:3-2007:4; the second p-value refers to the sample
1980:2-2007:4 and so on. The last considered sample is the full sample 1955:1-2007:4.
2. by fixing the starting point (str) of the sample and making the end point shift quarter by
quarter from an intermediate point of the sample up to the last available observation. The
4In the inflation equation, using four lags, the Federal funds rate is insignificant also in the absence
of any fiscal variables.
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first considered sample is 1955:1-1979:4. The second sample we consider is 1955:1-1980:1
and so on up to 1955:1-2007:4.
3. by rolling the sample (rol), i.e. by shifting the starting point and the endpoint of the
sample quarter by quarter. Hence the initial sample is 1955:1-1979:4, the second sample is
1955:2-1980:1 and so on up to 1980:3-2007:4.
The straight horizontal line in each quadrant of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 represents the 10 percent
significance level. Thus, anything below the line represents rejection of the Granger non-causality
null hypothesis.
Figure 3.3 shows that, in the output growth equation, recursive p-values of indirect taxes are
stable at the national level and less stable at the state-local level. For government surplus/deficit,
we find that both at the national and the state-local level, they are statistically significant in most
subsample though not in all of them. The p-values of the non-defense part of federal expenditures
and contributions for government social insurance are not stable.
Figure 3.4 shows that, apart from some subsamples for government deficit and state-local
investment expenditures, the remaining recursive p-values of the fiscal components for which we
find an information-content role for inflation are stable.
3.5.2 Formal stability tests
To formally evaluate the stability of coefficients in the Granger-style specifications, we run sta-
bility tests for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in the autoregressive coefficients of
the fiscal variables.
We compute three different statistics: the Quandt likelihood ratio statistic in Wald form
(sup-Wald) as in Andrews (1993); the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) exponential average Wald
statistic (exp-Wald); and the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) average Wald statistic (mean-Wald).
We apply a 15 percent symmetric sample trimming, which allows us to check whether a breakpoint
has occurred in the interval 1963:1-1998:4.
Table 3.7 displays the results of the tests. They fail to reject the null hypothesis of parameter
constancy in all cases.5
3.5.3 Out-of-sample properties
To evaluate the out-of-sample performances of the estimated equations, we use recursive least
squares. For each equation specification, we compute all feasible cases, starting from the smallest
5The approximate asymptotic p-values are provided by Hansen (1997).
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possible sample size and adding one observation at a time. At each step, we save the one-step
ahead forecast error to obtain a series of recursive residuals.6
We use each series of recursive residuals to compute the correspondent root mean squared
errors (RMSE), which we report in Table 3.8 in ascending order. A relatively low RMSE can
be interpreted as a further indicator of stability of the specification in question in comparative
terms. The ordering obtained in Table 3.8 is virtually coincident to the ordering implied by AIC
in Table 3.6. The specifications where fiscal variables have stable information content for output
growth or inflation are also the ones with the best out-of-sample performances. Indirect taxes
yield the lowest RMSE both in the output growth and in the inflation equation.
3.6 Concluding remarks
By running a number of straightforward statistical tests, we provide evidence that fluctuations in
certain fiscal variables contain valuable information to predict fluctuations in output and prices.
Our analysis also shows that the distinction between federal and state-local fiscal indicators
provides useful insights.
First, we find that variations in state-local indirect taxes as well as state government surplus
or deficit help predict output growth. Next, the federal counterparts of these indicators contain
valuable information for inflation. Finally, state-local expenditures help predict US inflation.
A set of formal and informal stability tests confirm that these relationships are stable. The
fiscal indicators in questions are also among the ones that yield the best in-sample and out-of-
sample performances.
In sum, we provide new stylized facts for US macroeconomic conditions related to fiscal
indicators. We believe that these new stylized facts can help identify possible fiscal and monetary
policy transmission channels that can be explored in future empirical and theoretical research.
6To obtain the recursive residuals we scale each one-step ahead forecast error by a term proportional
to the forecast variance. Namely, let x′tbt−1 be the forecast, where x
′
t is the row vector of observations
on the regressors in period t and bt−1 is the estimated vector of coefficients obtained by using data up
to period t − 1. The forecast error is yt − x′tbt−1, where yt is the actual observation of the dependent
variable, while the forecast variance is σ2
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Variables Measurement unit Type Freq. Sample
Gross domestic product Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5
Real Gross Domestic Product Billions of 2000 dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.6
Implicit GDP deflator Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9
Three-month federal funds rate Percentage MR Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 Federal Reserve Board
Government Current Receipts and Expenditures:
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Contributions for government social insurance Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Federal Government Current Receipts and Expenditures:
Total receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Contributions for government social insurance Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Federal defense expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5
Federal nondefense expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
State and Local Government Current Receipts and Expenditures: 
Total receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Current transfer receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Price Indices for Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment:
Government expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Government consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Government gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Federal expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Federal consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Federal gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
National defense Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Federal nondefense expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
State and local expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
State and local consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
State and local gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
SA = seasonally adjusted; MR = middle rate; Q.ly = quarterly; BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis; NIPA = National Income and Product Accounts
Source















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Government expenditures less transfers/GDP Federal expenditures less transfers/GDP
State and local expenditures less transfers/GDP








































































Government total expenditures/GDP Government total receipts/GDP
Federal total expenditures/GDP Federal total receipts/GDP
State and local total expenditures/GDP State and local total receipts/GDP









































































Government surplus/GDP Federal surplus/GDP State and local surplus/GDP
(c) Government surpluses or deficits.
Figure 3.1: US government expenditures and receipts as fractions of GDP (Source: our
computations using BEA data).
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(c) state-local government current receipts and expenditures.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) state-local government current receipts and expenditures.




Andrews, D. (1993): “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change With Unknown
Change Point,” Econometrica, 61(4), 821–856.
Andrews, D., and W. Ploberger (1994): “Optimal tests when a nuisance parameter is
present only under the alternative,” Econometrica, 62, 1383–1414.
Bahl, R., and J. Martinez-Vazquez (1990): “Inflation and the Real Growth of State and
Local Government Expenditures,” American Economic Review, 80(2), 166–70.
Barro, R. (1981): “Output effects of government purchases,” The Journal of Political Economy,
pp. 1086–1121.
Baxter, M., and R. King (1993): “Fiscal policy in general equilibrium,” The American
Economic Review, pp. 315–334.
Blanchard, O., and R. Perotti (2002): “An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic
Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117(4), 1329–1368.
Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum, and J. Fisher (2000): “Assessing the effects of fiscal shocks,”
NBER Working Papers, 7459.
(2004): “Fiscal Shocks and their Consequences,” Journal of Economic Theory, 115,
89–117.
Caldara, D., and C. Kamps (2008): “What are the effects of fiscal shocks? A VAR-based
comparative analysis,” ECB Working Paper Series, 877.
Calvo, G. (1983): “Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 12(3), 383–98.
Campbell, J., and N. Mankiw (1989): “Consumption, income, and interest rates: reinter-
preting the time series evidence,” NBER macroeconomics annual, pp. 185–216.
105
BIBLIOGRAPHY 106
Darroch, J., S. Lauritzen, and T. Speed (1980): “Markov fields and log-linear interaction
models for contingency tables,” The Annals of Statistics, pp. 522–539.
Dempster, A. (1972): “Covariance selection,” Biometrics, 28(1), 157–175.
Edelberg, W., M. Eichenbaum, and J. Fisher (1999): “Understanding the Effects of a
Shock to Government Purchases,” Review of Economics Dynamics, pp. 166–206.
Eichenbaum, M., and J. D. M. Fisher (2005): “Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37(1), 1–22.
Fats, A., and I. Mihov (2001): “The effects of fiscal policy on consumption and employment:
theory and evidence,” CEPR Discussion Papers, 2760.
Fats, A., and I. Mihov (2006): “The macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules in the US states,”
Journal of Public Economics, 90(1-2), 101 – 117.
Francis, N., and V. Ramey (2005): “Measures of per capita hours and their implications for
the technology-hours debate,” NBER working paper.
Friedman, B., and K. Kuttner (1992): “Money, income, prices, and interest rates,” American
Economic Review, 82(3), 472–492.
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